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Constitutional Process, Constitutionalism, and
the Eritrean Experience
Richard A. Rosent
I. Introduction
Discussion of comparative constitution-making processes is a
burgeoning academic field, spurred of late by the spate of
constitution-making in Eastern Europe following the dissolution of
the Soviet Union.' This Article examines the making of a
constitution in a different corner of the world - in Eritrea, a small,
newly independent nation in the Horn of Africa.
There is a personal touch to this Article. I spent the 1995-96
academic year teaching as a Fulbright Lecturer in Law at the
University of Asmara, the sole university in Eritrea. My stay
coincided with the latter stages of the Eritrean constitution-
drafting process. Although I had almost nothing to do with this2
process, I was keenly aware of the debates around me concerning
Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A.,
1969, Vanderbilt University; J.D., 1976, The University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
Professor Rosen would like to thank Rhea Lagano and Gregory Kilpatrick for
their research assistance, and James Scott McNeill for his help with research and
drafting.
I For a description of the constitution-making process in Eastern Europe, see Rett
R. Ludwikowski, Constitution Making in the Countries of Former Soviet
Dominance: Current Development, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 155 (1993) AND Jon
Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447
(1991) [hereinafter Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe]. See also Peter Paczolay,
Constitutional Transition and Legal Continuity, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 559 (1993)
(considering the 1989 constitutional revolution in Hungary); Rumyana Kolarova, Tacit
Agreements in the Bulgarian Transition to Democracy: Minority Rights' and
Constitutionalism, U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 23 (1993); Paul M. Schwartz,
Constitutional Change and Constitutional Legitimation: The Example of German
Unification, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1027 (1994); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 9 (1996) (describing "burst of constitution making" at the end of
cold war).
2 Most people I met upon my return to the United States assumed that any
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 24
one or another of the constitutional issues then being discussed. I
also knew some of the major actors who were drafting the
Constitution-most notably, Bereket Habte Selassie, the Chairman
of the Constitutional Commission of Eritrea (CCE), who is also a
Professor in the Department of African and Afro-American
Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,3 and
several of my Eritrean colleagues in Asmara were also deeply
involved in the process. They, along with other Eritreans I knew,
participated in various town meetings, radio and television
programs, and debates surrounding the constitutional process.4
Issues such as whether to designate national languages in the
Constitution,5 the wisdom of limiting the number of terms the
President could serve, and whether the President should be
directly elected or elected by the legislature,7 were constantly
discussed. I found these questions fascinating and their resolution
important, perhaps vital, to the future of Eritrea. Indeed, there is
American law professor in a developing country at the time a constitution was being
written had to have played a major role in writing it. In fact, my involvement in the
creation of the Eritrean Constitution was limited to discussions with Eritrean friends
who were working on it. As will be discussed more fully below, the drafting of the
Eritrean Constitution was an Eritrean project, from beginning to end, and foreign
influence, including mine, was minimal. This is not to say that foreigners were excluded
from any participation in the Eritrean constitutional process. The Constitutional
Commission of Eritrea did create an International Advisory Board, which met in Asmara
and provided some input for the Eritrean drafters. See infra notes 112-28 and
accompanying text.
' For a brief account of some of Dr. Bereket's other accomplishments, see infra
note 102. My reliance on first names to describe Eritreans in this Article is consistent
with Eritrean practice. The second name of a person is his or her father's name and is
most commonly used to distinguish between two people with the same first name.
I Unfortunately (at least from my point of view), almost all of this activity was
conducted in Tigrigna, the dominant language of Asmara and the highlands surrounding
the city. Activities in other parts of the country were conducted in Arabic or in one of
the predominant languages of the specific locale. Thus, aside from information shared
in classroom debates by my students, which were conducted in English, I had to rely on
accounts from others as to what was said in the various fora.
I The Eritreans decided not to mandate a national language. In fact, a provision in
the constitution dictates that "[the equality of all Eritrean languages is guaranteed."
En. CONST. ch. I, art. 4(3).
6 Two five-year terms was the final constitutional maximum. See id. ch. V, art.
41.
7 The Eritreans chose the latter. The President is to be elected by a majority of all
National Assembly members, following nomination by 20% of the Assembly. See id.
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certainly a law review article to be written about the content of the
Constitution of Eritrea, but this is not that Article.
What interested me most was the process swirling around me.
The Eritreans had embarked, self-consciously, on a protracted and
public process of constitution-making, and had done so in a
society largely illiterate and among the poorest in the world.8 The
Eritrean government had determined that a large amount of the
scarce human resources in Eritrea, and some of the best minds,
would be devoted to this project, although these resources were
also needed, often desperately, for other tasks in this war-shattered
country.9  Was this worth it? What difference would it make?
Would it not have been better to put the Commission members
together in a room for a month or two with orders to produce a
Constitution? Did the extended process itself have an independent
value? Would the Eritreans have been better off calling a
Constitutional Convention on the American model?
This Article addresses these questions, applying standards that
have been used to evaluate constitution-drafting processes
worldwide. First, however, in Part II, the Article begins with a
short history of Eritrea, for it is necessary to understand the
context in which any constitution-making process occurs before
evaluating that process.'0  Part III of this Article examines
constitutionalism and discusses theories of comparative
constitution-making." Part IV provides a more complete
description of the Eritrean process of constitution-drafting, 12 and
Part V attempts to evaluate the Eritrean process in light of the
I Only 20% of Eritreans are literate in one or more of the nation's many
languages. See Roy Pateman, Eritrea Takes Center Stage, CURRENT HIST., May 1994, at
228, 229 [hereinafter Center Stage]. A 1993 World Bank study estimated annual
income in Eritrea to be between $70 and $150 a year, less than half the $330 average for
other sub-Saharan African nations. See Dan Connell, Eritrea: An Island of Stability in
Strife-Filled Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 30, 1994, at 10 [hereinafter Island
of Stability].
9 There was some external funding support from foreign nations. See infra note
115.
10 See infra notes 14-51 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 76-184 and accompanying text.
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values and criteria described in Part III."3  Finally, Part VI
concludes that although it is too soon to determine whether the
Eritrean Constitutional venture will ultimately be successful, the
constitution-making process that led to the final draft of the
Eritrean Constitution was, overall, a positive one.
II. Eritrea-A Brief Description
Few Americans know much about Eritrea. To the extent it has
flashed across the consciousness. here, it has usually been in
connection with the terrible drought of the 1980s, the long war for
independence from Ethiopia,1 4 or one of the conflicts involving
Eritrea and its neighbors."
13 See infra notes 185-226 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
15 Forces from Eritrea and Yemen briefly fought over possession of the Hanish
Islands, an island group in the southern Red Sea, in late 1995 and 1996. See Daniel
Dzurek, The Hanish Islands Dispute, I ERI. STUD. REV. 133, 133 (1996). The
conflicting claims for the strategically located islands date back to the end of the
Ottoman Empire and to Eritrea's colonial period. See id. Eritrea and Yemen agreed to
French-sponsored arbitration in 1996. See id. On October 9, 1998, the Permanent Court
of Arbitration issued its decision, awarding Eritrea a series of small islets near the
Eritrean coast but giving the major islands under dispute to Yemen. See The Eritrea-
Yemen Arbitration (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Park/
5875/News/AnalysisNovl5_Hanish.html> (providing a link to <http:www.ibru.
dur.ac.uk> where the full decision can be accessed). Both sides accepted the ruling, and
relations between the two states were normalized. See Eritrea and Yemen: Islands'
Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A6, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Majpap File.
Eritrea has also experienced tense relations with Sudan. In December 1994, the
Eritrean government ended diplomatic relations with Sudan amid allegations that Sudan
was helping armed Islamic groups enter Eritrea and engage Eritrean forces. See Eritrea
Breaks Diplomatic Relations with Sudan, COMPASS NEWSWIRE, Dec. 6, 1994, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File; see generally Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean
Experiment: A Cautious Pragmatism?, 35 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 647 (1997) [hereinafter
Eritrean Experiment]. Most recently, Ethiopia and Eritrea have battled over a border
dispute involving boundaries dating back to the early 1900's, from the early Italian
colonial period. See Ian Fisher, Wherever That Town Is, Someone Will Die for It, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999, § 4, at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File. In
May 1998, Eritrean forces moved into the Badme region and fighting lasted for a month.
See id. Fighting erupted again February 6, 1999 and by February 26, 1999 Ethiopia had
succeeded in pushing the Eritreans out of Badme. See id. At that time, Eritrea agreed to
a peace proposal that was drafted by the Organization of African Unity in 1998. See id.
Ethiopia, however, has not agreed to a truce and fighting along the border has continued.
See id.
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One way to describe Eritrea, geographically, ethnically, and
culturally, is that it is a place where Africa meets the Middle East.
Geographically, the Red Sea borders Eritrea on the north, with
Arab Saudi Arabia and Yemen directly across the narrow waters.'
6
African Ethiopia is on the south, while the Sudan, now riven with
civil war between its largely African south and its Arab, Muslim
north, lies to the north and west. 7 Eritrea shares a border with
even tinier Djibouti in the southeast.'8
The ethnic, religious, and linguistic composition of Eritrea also
reflects this confluence of two worlds and a history of migrations
(and invasions) from the Arab north and west and African south.
The population, estimated (there has been no census in modem
times) at between two and one-half and three and one-half million
people,' 9 is roughly half Muslim and half Coptic Christian. °
Although there is a fair amount of intermingling, the Muslims
generally inhabit the northern coastal region and the western
lowlands, while the Coptics occupy the highlands and southern
regions.2' Most of the highland Christians speak Tigrigna and are
ethnically and linguistically close to the inhabitants of the northern
Tigrai province of Ethiopia,22 while the majority of the lowland
Muslims speak Tigre and have historically used Arabic as the
16 See DAVID POOL, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT'L, ERITREA: TOWARD UNITY IN
DIVERSITY 7 (1997) [hereinafter UNITY IN DIVERSITY].
17 See id.
18 See id. Conflict-ridden Somalia occupies the rest of the Horn of Africa but does
not border Eritrea. See DAVID POOL, ERITREA-AFRCA'S LONGEST WAR 6 (1982)
[hereinafter LONGEST WAR].
19 In addition to the lack of a census, the large number of refugees still returning to
the country makes a more accurate count impossible. See RANDALL FEGLEY, ERITREA
xvi (World Bibliographical Series Vol. 181, 1995); see also UNITY IN DIVERSITY, supra
note 16, at 8. Although many Eritrean refugees have returned to the nation, 700,000 still
live in the Diaspora, including 500,000 in the Sudan. See Roy PATEMAN,
ERITREA: EVEN THE STONES ARE BURNING 252-53 (1998) [hereinafter STONES].
20 See STONES, supra note 19, at 4-5. There is a small but noticeable Roman
Catholic population left from the years of Italian rule, as well as various Protestant
denominations. See id. One small ethnic group, the Kunama, is mostly Muslim and
animist but includes some Christians. See id. at 5.
21 See FEGLEY, supra note 19, at xvii; Roy Pateman, The Legacy of Eritrea's
National Question, Soc'Y, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 37, 39 [hereinafter Legacy].
22 See FEGLEY, supra note 19, at xvii.
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language of education in the Koranic schools.23
Eritrea is primarily rural and very poor. The capital and only
sizable city, Asmara, perches on the edge of the Red Sea
escarpment and has a population of approximately 400,000.24
Most of the population consists of highland peasant farmers
struggling to wrest survival from drought-ridden, rocky land, and
lowland farmers and pastoralists tending their crops and animals.25
Since its independence, Eritrea is constantly ranked among the
world's poorest nations26 with an annual per capita income
estimated at between $70 and $150 per person.27
A. Early History of Eritrea
At one time or another, various parts of Eritrea were ruled by
the Ottomans, Egyptians, Axumites, Ethiopians, and a sundry of
23 See UNITY IN DIVERSITY, supra note 16, at 8, 21. There are actually nine
officially recognized ethnic groups in Eritrea, but a large majority of the population
belongs to one of the two groups discussed in the text. See id. at 8-9.
24 There are two port cities, Massawa and Assab. Massawa is the major port for
Eritrea proper and is connected by road to Asmara. A railroad between Massawa and
Asmara, constructed by the Italians during Eritrea's colonial period and dismantled
during the war with Ethiopia, is being rebuilt. Assab, situated close to the Eritrea and
Djibouti border, is not connected by internal road to the rest of Eritrea; it has
traditionally served as a port for Ethiopia. One can only travel overland from Asmara or
Massawa to Assab by going through Ethiopia or by taking a several day journey on
unpaved tracks through the scorchingly hot Dankalia Depression.
The other notable city is Keren, the gateway from the highlands to the western
lowlands, which has a population of about 50,000. About 20% of Eritreans live in the
cities mentioned above or in towns, with the rest living in rural areas. See STONES,
supra note 19, at 4.
25 See UNITY IN DIVERSITY, supra note 16, at 8. Despite Eritrea's large percentage
of agricultural workers, imports, much of it in foreign aid, were still necessary for
approximately one-third of Eritrea's food needs in 1994. See STONES, supra note 19, at
242. Understandably, the Eritrean government considers food security for the nation to
be an important national goal. See id.
26 By some estimates, however, the Eritrean economy is growing at a rate of 7% to
10% a year, and foreign nations have provided $250 million in loans through the World
Bank to aid economic growth. See STONES, supra note 19, at 240. The Eritrean
government appears committed to a mixed market economy led by a private sector and
governed by liberal trade policies. See id.
27 See Island of Stability, supra note 8, at 10. As in much of the developing world,
a large part of the population lives outside of the money economy, so estimates vary
greatly.
[Vol. 24
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indigenous and foreign powers." Until recently, there was no
identifiable political entity that could be considered a precursor for
Eritrea.29 This changed with the Italian colonization in the second
half of the nineteenth century. In 1889, Eritrea was formally
recognized as an Italian colony by the Treaty of Uccali between
Italy and Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia.0 Eritrea has existed as a
colony, state, administrative unit, or nation within these borders
ever since.31 The Italians ruled the colony until they were defeated
by the British during World War II, and a British military
administration governed Eritrea until 1952.32
28 See BEREKET HABTE SELASSIE, CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN THE HORN OF
AFRICA 49-51 (1980) [hereinafter HORN OF AFRICA].
29 See Minasse Haile, The Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 479, 482 (1994).
30 See HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 28, at 51-55. In 1869, the opening of the Suez
Canal marked the beginning of an increased Italian presence in the Horn of Africa.
Between 1869 and 1880, the Italian Rubattino Navigation Company bought land near
the port of Assab from local chiefs, and the Italian government assumed control of the
area in 1882. See id. at 51-52. In the late 1880's, an Italian drive inland, which
included the occupation of Massawa, ended temporarily in a defeat by Ethiopian forces.
See id. at 52. However, Emperor Yohannes of Ethiopia, Menelik's predecessor, was
killed battling Islamic Mahdist neighbors in western Ethiopia in 1889. See Haile, supra
note 29, at 483. Emperor Menelik was thus content to allow Italian control of the
Eritrean region, via the Treaty of Uccialli and the 1896 Addis Ababa Treaty, as a buffer
between Ethiopia and his Mahdist adversaries in the Sudan. See id.; see also FEGLEY,
supra note 19, at xxxii. The name "Eritrea," chosen by the king of Italy for the new
colony in 1890, comes from the term Mare Erythraeum (Red Sea) used by Roman
geographers who mapped the area. See FEGLEY, supra note 19, at xxxiii.
31 See HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 28, at 49-51.
32 The British never indicated an interest in acquiring permanent control over
Eritrea and seem to have viewed their occupation as a necessary corollary to the military
and political imperatives of the war and its aftermath. See OOKBAZGHI YOHANNES,
ERITREA, A PAWN IN WORLD POLITICS 51-54 (1991). They did, however, have an
interest in dividing Eritrea so that the Sudan, a British colony, could acquire western
Eritrea. See id. at 53. To that end, the British promoted Islam and Arabic in the western
part of Eritrea and stressed ethnic ties rather than nationalist unity in their policies. See
id. Eritreans tend to remember the British most for their willingness to allow the
conquered Italians to continue to exercise colonial prerogatives (for example, Italian
judges still presided over disputes between Eritrean and Italian landowners) and for their
dismantling of much of the Italian-built industrial base of Eritrea to areas of more
importance to the British. See id. at 52-53. From 1941 through 1947, the British
occupiers removed industrial equipment worth £85 million from Eritrea. See id. at 54.
The result was a sharp decline in the production of coffee, gold, and other important
commodities. See id. During this time, the British even distributed 10,000 acres of
1999]
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During the latter stages of the British rule, the United Nations
(U.N.) accepted the task of resolving the question of the future of
Eritrea.33 The U.N. held hearings in Eritrea, where various
competing factions supported union with Ethiopia, partition, or
independence. 4  A divided U.N. panel compromised by
recommending that Eritrea receive autonomy within a federated
Ethiopia.35 This formula, replete with a U.N.-drafted Constitution
for Eritrea and provisions for an Eritrean National Assembly
within the larger Ethiopian state, was the choice of the General
Assembly.36
Eritrean land to demobilized Italian soldiers. See id. at 54-55.
33 See Semere Haile, Historical Background to the Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict, in
THE LONG STRUGGLE OF ERITREA 19, 19 (Lionel Cliff & Basil Davidson eds., 1988). By
the terms of a peace treaty between Italy and the Four Powers (Britain, France, the
Soviet Union, and the United States), ratified by Italy on August 2, 1947, Italy
renounced all rights in its colonies. See id. A Four-Power Commission of Investigation
was created to determine the desires of former colonials, and the commission submitted
a report to the Four Powers' Council of Foreign Ministers on August 31, 1948. See id.
However, the Council could not agree on the colonies' fate by September 15, as required
by the treaty with Italy. See id. The treaty mandated that in the absence of an
agreement, the United Nations would handle the matter of the colonies. See id.
34 The Unionist party, originally founded by Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie as
the Society for the Love of the Land of Eritrea in 1941, was committed to union between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. See STONES, supra note 19, at 68. The Independence Bloc and the
Eritrean Liberal Progressive Party sought an independent, undivided Eritrea. See id. at
68-69. Although the Unionists were in the minority in a Four Power-sponsored 1947
election, an Ethiopian-sponsored intimidation campaign by the Unionists led to a three-
way split in the Independence Bloc in 1950, with one group willing to settle for
federation with Ethiopia and another only seeking independence for western Eritrea.
See id. at 71. Some delegations to the U.N. Commission of Inquiry for Eritrea, however,
did advocate independence, but the Commission professed some difficulty in
determining the political views of the majority of Eritreans. See DAN CONNELL,
AGAINST ALL ODDS: A CHRONICLE OF THE ERITREAN REVOLUTION 55-56 (1993)
[hereinafter AGAINST ALL ODDS].
31 Within the U.N.'s five-member commission, Norway, South Africa, and Burma
preferred a federation relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia, while Guatemala and
Pakistan favored eventual Eritrean independence. See BEREKET HABTE SELASSIE,
ERITREA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 33 (1989) [hereinafter ERITREA AND THE UNITED
NATIONS].
36 The General Assembly adopted this federation plan as Resolution 390(V) on
December 2, 1950, by a vote of 46 to 10 (with four abstentions). See BouTRos
BOUTROS-GHALI, Introduction to THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF
ERITREA at 10-11, U.N. Sales No. E. 96.1.10 (1996); see also G.A. Res. 390(V), U.N.
GAOR, 5h Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc A/1775 (1950) (concerning the General
Assembly resolution regarding Eritrea).
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B. Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Struggle for Independence
The United Nations may not have noticed the inevitable
contradiction caused by creating an autonomous democratic polity
within one of the world's last remaining absolute monarchies, but
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia certainly did. Never enamored
by challenges to his authority, he steadily eroded the Eritreans'
independence and power, and in 1962 he formally dissolved the
federation and annexed Eritrea for Ethiopia."
By 1961, political resistance to the Ethiopianization of Eritrea
led to the first sporadic instances of armed struggle, and, as the
decade progressed, this defiance coalesced into a potent guerrilla
force under the leadership of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).38
However, the ELF, rooted in the Muslim community of Eritrea,
never successfully absorbed the growing influx of Christian
highlanders who, chafing under the increasing Ethiopian
domination of Eritrea, flocked to join the struggle.39 In the early
1970s, a group of ELF commanders, both Muslim and Christian,
defected from the ELF and formed a rival group, the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which pursued an aggressively
37 See STONES, supra note 19, at 6. Steps toward annexation included the banning
of political parties in 1956 and the replacement of the Eritrean flag with that of Ethiopia
in 1960. See id.
38 See AGAINST ALL ODDS, supra note 34, at 58. The first Eritrean group to
struggle against the Ethiopian state in this era was actually the Eritrean Liberation
Movement (ELM), established in 1958. See id. The ELM proclaimed a secular
approach to resistance and later competed with the ELF for support, sometimes in armed
combat. See id. By 1965, however, the ELF had become the dominant resistance force
in Eritrea. See RUTH IYOB, THE ERITREAN STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 106 (1995)
[hereinafter INDEPENDENCE].
39 The tension between Christians and Muslims in the ELF was exacerbated by
ELF food raids on Christian villagers and the Ethiopian Army's establishment of a
special anti-guerrilla division recruited largely from Christian regions. See
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 38, at 113. The ELF leadership tried to handle the sectarian
differences by creating separate Muslim and Christian battalions, which led, at times, to
charges of discrimination against the Christians and sometimes even to battles between
the sectarian forces. See HAGGAI ERLICH, THE STRUGGLE OVER ERITREA 1962-1978 23
(1983). In 1967, for example, Muslim fighters were trained in Syria, where the Ba'thist
regime saw Eritrea as part of the Arabic world, while Christian fighters were trained in
Sudan, where the fighters were forbidden to speak Tigrigna and told that the ELF's goal
was to "Arabize" Eritrea. See id. 23-24. In one incident, a number of Christian
guerrillas were killed by fellow rebels under suspicion of spying for Ethiopia. See
UNITY IN DIVERSITY, supra note 16, at 11.
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secular and non-sectarian policy of uniting all of the ethnic groups
and religions in Eritrea behind the liberation struggle.4 °
Despite strong military and political backing from the United
States and other Western powers, Haile Selassie was unable to
quell the Eritrean uprising. Increasing political unrest in Ethiopia
proper undermined his efforts to subdue Eritrea, and the Emperor
was removed from power and, some believe, murdered in the mid
1970s.4' By this time, an Eritrean victory by either political or
military means seemed within grasp.42  This changed abruptly in
1978, when the ruling Ethiopian junta, the Dergue,43 declared
Ethiopia a socialist state and received massive military assistance
from the Soviet Union and its allies. The ELF and EPLF were
driven back from the environs of Asmara into the hinterlands,
44
and a new stage of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict began.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the two dominant Eritrean
liberation forces sporadically fought each other as well as the
Ethiopians. By the mid 1980s, the EPLF had vanquished the ELF
and had become the only significant armed resistance movement
on Eritrean soil. 45 The EPLF fighters survived continual Ethiopian
(and Soviet) offensives, and by the late 1980s they were beginning
40 See AGAINST ALL ODDS, supra note 34, at 79, 83. At its inception in February
1972, the EPLF included Christian rebels (comprising more than half of its fighters) and
a Foreign Mission led by an Arab Nationalist. See ERLICH, supra note 39, at 31. A
nationalist focus and Marxist ideology were key unifying forces for the religiously
diverse movement. See id.
4| For a fascinating account of the last years of Haile Selassie's rule and of his
ultimate fall from power, see RYSZARD KAPUSCINKI, THE EMPEROR: DOWNFALL OF AN
AUTOCRAT (William R. Brand & Katerzyna Mroczkowska-Brand trans., Vintage Books
1984) (1983).
42 See LONGEST WAR, supra note 18, at 54. At the end of 1977, the EPLF and ELF
together held all of Eritrea except Asmara, a few isolated garrisons, and parts of the area
around the port of Massawa.
43 Dergue means "Committee" in Amharic. Amharic was the language of the
Ethiopian ruling class until 1991.
44 See INDEPENDENCE, supra note 38, at 130. From 1978 to 1980, the Dergue
began five offensives in Eritrea, enabling them to recapture key towns and forcing the
EPLF to retreat to a base in Sahel in northern Eritrea. See id.
41 See id. at 131. In 1980 and 1981, the EPLF pushed ELF units into the Sudan,
where the remnant, influenced by foreign governments, splintered into shifting alliances.
See AGAINST ALL ODDS, supra note 34, at 208.
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to claim significant battlefield victories.46  As the fighting
continued, the EPLF gradually shed its Marxist ideology, and as
early as 1987 it enunciated a new vision of a future Eritrean
society-non-aligned, secular, pluralistic, democratic, and, most of
all, independent-which was to become the basis of the future
constitutional venture.
C. Eritrean Independence
In 1991, the EPLF liberated Asmara, allowing the Ethiopian
troops and their supporters to leave.4' A short time later, the allied
Eritrean and Ethiopian guerrilla forces overthrew the Dergue.49
Since the liberation of Asmara in 1991, Eritrea has been ruled by a
Provisional Government consisting almost entirely of the
leadership of the EPLF, now reconstituted as the People's Front
for Democratic Justice (PFDJ) and headed by Isaias Afwerki, the
wartime leader of the EPLF ° The Eritreans postponed formal
independence until a U.N.-supervised referendum could be held,
and finally declared the existence of their new nation in May 1993,
after more than 99.8% of the population voted for independence."
46 See INDEPENDENCE, supra note 38, at 132-34.
47 See id. at 132. The "new vision" was announced at the EPLF's Second
Congress in 1987 and represented a revision of the 1977 National Democratic
Programme. See id. The revised program also contained significant organizational and
political changes, including new provisions on developing a multi-party political system
and a mixed economy. See id.
48 See id. at 136.
49 The EPLF allied itself with the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) for a series of coordinated attacks on the Ethiopian government of
Mengistu Hailemariam, who fled to Zimbabwe on May 21. See id. The combined
forces seized the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, on May 28. See id. Subsequently, the
new Transitional Government of Ethiopia endorsed Eritrea's demand for self-
determination. See id. at 136-38.
50 See STONES, supra note 19, at 238-39.
"' See INDEPENDENCE, supra note 38, at 137-41. For an historical account of
Eritrea and of the long Eritrean struggle for independence, see generally AGAINST ALL
ODDS, supra note 34; INDEPENDENCE, supra note 38; STONES, supra note 19; Thomas
Keneally, In Eritrea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 42; Robert D.
Kaplan, The Loneliest War: Civil War in Ethiopia, ATLANTIC, July 1998. For a
fascinating fictionalized account of the latter stages of the fight for independence, see
THOMAS KENEALLY, To ASMARA (1989). There are also a number of first hand accounts
by those who lived through this time. See ABEBA TESFAGIORGIS, A PAINFUL SEASON, A
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
III. Evaluating Constitutional Process
A. Substance
The first, and most obvious, way to measure any constitution-
making process is to determine whether the drafters produced a
constitution that provides, for the citizens and their state, an
optimal chance for survival, growth, and renewal of the polity.
52
The constitution must provide for various governmental structures
and must allocate power and responsibilities between the different
branches of government. Constitutions also set out the rights of
the people vis-a-vis the government and provide limitations on
governmental authority and power.53 To be useful, the provisions
adopted must reflect not only sound political theory but also the
values and historical experiences of the people whom the
constitution will govern.54
Since the focus of this Article is on the process of making the
Eritrean Constitution rather than the document's substance, I will
not discuss the Constitution itself in detail. However, it is worth
remarking briefly on some of the provisions that reflect on the
chances for democracy and the rule of law to succeed in Eritrea.
The Eritrean Constitution drafters produced a compact but
inclusive constitution, one that resembles the U.S. Constitution in
its brevity and generality,55 but which also reflects the Eritrean
emphasis on national unity and inclusiveness. It includes
provisions for a fully independent judiciary with plenary powers of
STUBBORN HOPE (1992); ILLEN GHEBRAI, ERITREA: MIRACLELAND (1993).
52 As Professor Bruce Ackerman notes, it is up to the constitution drafters to
"somehow hammer out the guiding principles of their movement into an enduring form
that will shape political action in the years ahead." BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF
LIBERAL REVOLUTION 49 (1992) [hereinafter LIBERAL REVOLUTION].
53 See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 327, 327 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988)
(noting the role of constitutions in limiting the power of governments, including
majoritarian governments).
51 See Ludwikowski, supra note 1, at 158 (noting that one significant reason for
the failure of constitutions in the Third World was the tendency to copy constitutional
structures from pre-existing models, regardless of their applicability to the particular
situation).
11 The Eritrean Constitution contains 59 articles in 7 chapters. See Em. CONST.
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judicial review,56 as well as strong guarantees of individual rights,57
especially rights for women." The President is limited io two five
year terms, 9 and the conditions under which the Constitution can
be suspended are strictly limited, both in duration and in effect.6
One can quarrel about some of the choices made by the Eritrean
drafters - for a centralized rather than a federal state,6' for a
unicameral legislature, or for election of the President by the
legislature instead of by popular vote63 - and still conclude that it
is a reasonable, well-written Constitution. It is a Constitution
written by and for Eritreans,64 and 'is one which offers every
opportunity for democracy and the rule of law to flourish in the
particular circumstances of Eritrean society.
B. Fostering Constitutionalism
The world, unfortunately, is cluttered with reasonable, well-
written constitutions, many of which have turned out to have little
more value than the wallpaper on the houses of the politicians and
generals who have ignored them.65  The history of constitutional
failures leads to the second widely accepted measure of a
constitutional process-the extent to which the process fosters
56 See id. ch. VI, arts. 48, 49.
" See id. ch. III.
58 "[Tjhe fact that Eritrean women's heroic participation in the struggle for
independence... will serve as an unshakable foundation for our commitment to create a
society in which women and men shall interact on the bases of mutual respect, solidarity
and equality." Id. pmbl. For more on the constitutional process and women's rights, see
infra notes 101-49 and accompanying text.
59 See ER. CONST. ch. V, art. 41.
60 See id. ch. III, arts. 26, 27.
61 See id. ch. I, art. 1(5) (establishing Eritrea as a unitary State divided into units of
local government).
62 See id. ch. IV.
63 See id. ch. V, art. 41.
6 See infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
65 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA.
L. REV. 771 (1997) [hereinafter World Constitutionalism] (discussing failed
constitutional experiments); Ludwikowski, supra note 1, at 158; ZIYAD MOTALA,
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN AFRICA: MOVING BEYOND ETHNIC BASED CONSTITUTIONS
TOWARDS A RESPONSIVE AND DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 14-20 (discussing failed
liberal constitutional models in post-independence Africa).
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constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism is the societal acceptance of the rule of law
under the constitution. It recognizes the constitution as the basic
compact between the people and the government, above all other
laws, serving as the ultimate arbiter of all disputes. It is a basic
requirement of an enduring constitutional order.66 It is the
philosophy that forces a leader to leave office, despite desiring to
retain it, if the constitution so dictates; it is the doctrine that makes
those wishing to replace a leader follow the rules in the
constitution rather than resort to other means. If constitutionalism
is sufficiently imbued in a society, even a faulty constitution can
survive, by amendment or adaption. If it is absent, the most
carefully crafted constitutional document is virtually worthless.67
The relationship between the constitution-making process and
the fostering of constitutionalism is at best imperfect, 6s but it is
indisputable that the manner of constitution-making can
significantly impact the development of constitutionalism by
fostering the legitimacy of the constitution as the basic source of
66 This concept of constitutionalism presupposes a written constitution recognized
as the supreme law of the land, and is consonant with the American experience. See
GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at 13. Further, "the idea of conducting government under law is
the core of American constitutionalism." Id.; see also Anthony Lewis, Panel I: The
Constitutional Culture of America, in THE LEGACY OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN
ASSESSMENT FOR THE THIRD CENTURY 38-39 (William S. Livingston ed., 1987) (noting
"civil religion" in the United States is based on the notion of the Constitution as a higher
law). There are, however, other definitions given to the term. See GRIFFIN, supra note
1, at 11 (discussing different concepts of constitutionalism); Sunstein, supra note 53
(describing the "dramatically different" forms of constitutionalism); Thomas C. Grey,
Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework, in NOMOS xx: CONSTITUTIONALISM 189,
189 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) (discussing "long-standing
confusion" about the meaning of constitutionalism).
67 The existence of a written constitution is insufficient to limit government abuses
and arbitrariness, as demonstrated by countries, such as apartheid-era South Africa,
where the Constitution was used to support an unjust and oppressive regime. See
Gordon J. Schochet, Introduction: Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and the Study of
Politics, in NOMOS xx: CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 66, at 1, 5.
68 Of course, the constitution-drafting process is only one ingredient in the
development of constitutionalism, and there is more than one example of a flourishing
constitutional regime created by imperfect means. See, e.g., Viktor Mayer-Schonberger,
Into the Heart of the State: Intervention Through Constitution-Making, 8 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 315 (discussing U.S. intervention in constitution-making in the Philippines
and in post-war Germany and Japan).
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law within the society. 69 To foster constitutionalism, the process
itself must be sufficiently transparent, and there must be sufficient
popular participation to allow the constitution to be claimed as a
product of popular sovereignty of the peoples' will, rather than an
expression of their rulers' interests.7° In a society which has
limited experience with successful constitutional governance, and
in which the notions of democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule
of law are not well developed, the drafters must also popularize
and educate the people about these concepts, for a people cannot
be wedded to something which they do not understand.71
The constitution-making process can also foster
constitutionalism by its impact on the rulers. Like the rest of the
69 One of the strongest proponents of this viewpoint is Professor Bruce Ackerman
who has discussed the wave of constitution-making in Eastern Europe. See LIBERAL
REVOLUTION, supra note 52; World Constitutionalism, supra note 65. There was a
period of time when constitutional failures in the nineteenth and twentieth century, in
European countries like Spain, Weimar Germany, and developing countries throughout
the world, led many to look at the whole notion of constitutional process and
constitutionalism with a jaundiced eye. See World Constitutionalism, supra note 65, at
771 (noting jaundiced view of constitution-making and constitutionalism). Ackerman is
not alone, for, as Andrew Arato has noted, the process used for drafting and
implementing a constitutional process is an essential ingredient for constitutional
success or, at the very least, "can hardly be seen as irrelevant." Andrew Arato, Forms of
Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOzO L. REv. 191, 191 (1995).
70 See David A.J. Richards, Comparative Revolutionary Constitutionalism: A
Research Agenda For Comparative Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 14-15 (1993)
(noting that popular discussion and debate in American constitution-making was
important for the legitimacy of institutions created by the Constitution); see also Arato,
supra note 69, at 205. According to Arato, Hannah Arendt saw "the extraordinary
commitment of a large number of (admittedly self-selected) people to political debate,
discussion and participation" as the great hallmark of the U.S. and French constitutional
movements of the late 18th Century. Id. (citing HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 162
(1965)).
71 Ultimately, no objective is more important than civic education-the
inculcation of civic virtues. A viable democracy requires that citizens
understand that liberty is not license, that the open society depends on mutual
tolerance, that rights have a universal quality. A people who do not understand
the basic precepts of free government are unlikely to keep it alive and vibrant.
A.E. Dick Howard, Constitution Making in Central and Eastern Europe, 28 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 5, 15-16 (1994); see also Alan S. Rosenbaum, Introduction to
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 5 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1988)
(noting the importance of constitutionalism for development of democracy in societies
with long non-democratic traditions).
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populace, those in charge of society are often quite uneducated in
constitutional values. Constitution-making is often made possible
by revolution, or at least by years of struggle, political or military,
against authoritarian or dictatorial regimes, and these are not
conditions likely to produce rulers fully steeped in the wisdom of
limited government and attuned to the blessings of constitutional
faith.72 Further, the more the rulers publicly commit themselves to
the constitutional venture and announce that the ultimate success
of their revolutionary venture will be embodied in the constitution,
the harder it will be for them, or their successors, to turn around
and cast aside its provisions.
Exactly how to accomplish these goals-to produce a
worthwhile constitution, to involve the society and the rulers in the
process while educating them about the value of
constitutionalism-is another matter.74 The means available must
of necessity differ, for the particular factors of each society in its
own epoch of constitution-making both limit the constitutional
process and provide unique opportunities for the realization of
constitutionalism." History does not judge the makers of a
72 See Jon Elster, Essay: Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making
Process, 45 DuKE L. J. 364, 394 (1995) [hereinafter Forces and Mechanisms] (noting
that the turbulent conditions that produce the opportunity for constitution-making tend
to foster passion rather than reason, and thus "the task of constitution making generally
emerges in conditions that are likely to work against good constitution making").
73 Ackerman notes that once the elite accept the constitution, it will be more
difficult for them to upset the "constitutional equilibrium." LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra
note 52, at 62; see also Rosenbaum, supra note 71, at 5 (noting the importance of
commitment of contemporary rulers to the constitutionalization of society); GRIFFIN,
supra note 1, at 15 (noting the importance of political actors accepting the constitution
as the fundamental law).
74 As recently as 1995, one commentator, John Elster, noted the absence of a
meaningful body of literature "that deals with the constitution-making process in a
positive, explanatory perspective .... [T]here is not, to my knowledge, a single book or
even article that considers the process of constitution-making, in its full generality, as a
distinctive object of positive analysis." Forces and Mechanisms, supra note 72, at 364.
Elster believes that what is needed is literature fully discussing "the optimal design of
the constitution-making process, an issue that is both separate from and indirectly
related to the issue of designing the optimal constitution." Id. at 365.
" "In a given situation, the circumstances must take priority in the analysis, for
among them lie the important factors of a country's or a culture's own constitutional
experience, from which it is possible to learn." Arato, supra note 69, at 219. Given the
apparent success of the American constitutional venture, as well as the United States'
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constitution on whether they used some theoretically perfect
procedure, or even whether they measured up well to that
procedure in the abstract. Ultimately, the test has to be whether
the drafters used well their own particular historical moment, with
all of its opportunities and limitations.
IV. Creating the Eritean Constitution
A. The Historical Moment
Eritrea's epoch for constitution-making began in the spring of
1993, when independence was formally proclaimed. The practical
problems facing the country were huge: extreme poverty, a nation
ravaged by decades of war, deprivation, and at times even famine.
The population was largely illiterate,76 with almost no history of
democratic governance at the national level.77 The country's
infrastructure had been destroyed,78 education neglected,79 and the
current dominance in the world, it is perhaps inevitable for the American constitutional
process to have become, in some minds, the model for all constitutional processes, the
lodestar by which other processes are measured. Perhaps the leading proponent of this
"American exceptionalism" is Professor Bruce Ackerman. In his writings, Ackerman
describes (or often prescribes) constitution-making procedures from those states
emerging from the ruins of the Soviet empire. See LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 52;
World Constitutionalism, supra note 65. Ackerman notes that the constitutional
convention is "one of the most famous American contributions to the fund of Western
political thought and practice." LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 52, at 51. Ackerman
sees the requirement of separate ratifying conventions elected separately from existing
governments as the "second decisive step" in the constitutional process. Id. at 54.
However, Ackerman's emphasis on exporting the American model has been strongly
criticized. See Arato, supra note 69, at 213; David Golove, Liberal Revolution,
Constitutionalism and the Consolidation of Democracy: A Review of Bruce Ackerman's
THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 1591, 1594 (1993) (book
review); Book Note, We The People of... Europe?, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1364 (1993)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992)).
76 See Steve Steinberg, Audacious Eritrea: Hope Springs on the Horn, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 15, 1995, at A52; supra note 8.
17 Democracy does, however, have some roots in the traditional culture of Eritrea,
with the village council, or baito, playing an important judicial and administrative role
throughout much of Eritrean rural society. See UNITY IN DIVERSITY, supra note 16, at
25. During such village assemblies, leaders were elected in democratic fashion. See
Paulos Zaid, Indigenous Democracy, Single Spirit, ERI. PROFILE, Jan. 11, 1997, at 4.
78 See AGAINST ALL ODDS, supra note 34, at 248.
71 See STONES, supra note 19, at 221.
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sole university virtually dismantled.0 Many of the best and most
educated had died in the war or had abandoned their intellectual
pursuits for life in the trenches. " It would be no easy task to
involve the population in anything other than the mechanics of
survival and rebuilding of the economy.
Most of the people could not be reached by the one television
station in the country, which at that time broadcast only
sporadically.82  More people did have some access to radio.83  A
significant number of Eritreans, some estimate over one million,
remained in the Diaspora, in Ethiopia proper, in Sudanese refugee
camps, or were scattered throughout the rest of the world.
4
The Eritreans did have one significant asset-Eritrea, circa
1993, presented almost a textbook example of what Bruce
Ackerman has called a "constitutional moment,"85 a crucial point
in time when a victorious revolutionary movement has an
80 See Andrea Useem, Eritrea Strives to Transform A Struggling University Into A
Vital Institution, CHRON. HIGHER LEARNING, May 29, 1998, at A47; STONES, supra note
19, at 247; Craig Calhoun & Pamela DeLargy, Rights After Liberation, DISSENT,
Summer 1996, at 129, 130.
81 Approximately 100,000 men and women fought (without pay) in the liberation
struggle, and demobilization has been an important political issue. See Roy Pateman,
Eritrea Takes a World Stage, CURRENT HIST., May 1994, at 229. Meanwhile, Eritrea
continues to lack the teachers, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals that are essential
to transforming both the economy and society. See id.
82 See Steinberg, supra note 76. Mr. Steinberg led a workshop on television
production for Eritrean TV.
83 The EPLF used radio to communicate with the general populace during the
liberation struggle. See id.; see also Interview by Menghis Samuel with Dr. Bereket
Habte Selassie, Chairman, Constitution Commission of Eritrea (Aug. 7, 1994) (visited
Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.primenet.com/-ephrem/InterviewBereket> [hereinafter
Menghis Samuel's Interview of Dr. Bereket] ("[I]f you want to reach a vast majority of
people [in Eritrea], you have to use Radio.").
84 See STONES, supra note 19, at 252-53; John Balzar, An Expectant Eritrea Calls
Its Children Home, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 4, 1995, at 22A.
85 LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 52, at 49. This is a time, according to
Ackerman, that revolutionaries can:
somehow hammer out the guiding principles of their movement into an
enduring form that will shape political action in the years ahead. Writing a
constitutional text offers an opportunity for a victorious movement to make a
collective effort both to frame their fundamental principles and to mobilize
broad popular support for their crucial initiatives.
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unparalleled opportunity to transform triumphal unity into a
constitution that could "function for the wider public as the central
symbol of its revolutionary achievement and become, over time,
the center of an enlightened kind of patriotism. 86 The Eritreans
had achieved victory against overwhelming odds. They seemed
united as a people and had established their new society with
minimum rancor, even against the Ethiopians. They confirmed
their collective desire for independence and national unity by an
overwhelming referendum result in favor of independence.87
Even the overwhelming unity, however, presented a problem
for successfully fostering constitutionalism. The unity that
pervaded Eritrea in 1993 was unusual in its magnitude. There
were no functioning opposition political parties in 199388 and,
aside from organized religion, virtually no functioning civil
society at all outside of the EPLF/PFDJ and its connected
organizations. No independent Eritrean political parties had been
allowed by the Ethiopians,89 and the EPLF had long since
eliminated the rival ELF as a meaningful political voice inside the
country. 9° The government in place was unmistakably a partially
transformed military government, and there was no indication that
it was interested in fostering a current opposition within the
society.
There was, therefore, little opportunity for the Eritreans to
engage in the sort of political horse-trading that characterized the
American constitutional process, as well as some of the more
recent constitutional endeavors; a process which by its nature
ensures that at least some of the different interest groups in the
society have their say in the constitutional design.9' There is no
86 Id. at 61.
87 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
88 See Eritrean Experiment, supra note 15, at 667.
89 See AGAINST ALL ODDS, supra note 34, at 57.
90 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Defeis, Armenian Constitutional Referendum: Towards A
Democratic Process, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 269 (1995) (noting that the Armenian
constitutional process was characterized by challenging political elites in the dominant
political party and organizing several new, smaller political parties); Elster, supra note 1
(discussing the role of various opposition forces in constitution-making in post cold-war
Eastern Europe); Albie Sachs, The Creation of South Africa's Constitution, 41 N.Y.L.
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such thing, however, as absolute and lasting national unity.
Different segments of society, even if temporarily united behind a
nationalist goal, like independence, have different interests-
ethnic, religious, economic-and constitution-makers ignore these
interests only at a grave risk for the development of a healthy
constitutionalism.
Indeed, the potential divisions within Eritrean society,
especially the religious and ethnic ones, were necessarily a matter
of serious concern to the Eritrean constitution drafters. This is a
society with nine recognized ethnic groups, and with a population
half Christian and half Muslim. 92  There was a history of
sectarianism between these groups up until the ascendancy of the
EPLF," and Eritrea's religious and related ethnic divisions are
frighteningly similar to those that have torn apart other African
countries, such as Nigeria and the neighboring Sudan. 94 Religion
and ethnicity were problems that had to be addressed so that all
groups would feel included in the process and would develop a
stake in the coming constitution.
Potentially even more intractable was the problem of gender
and women's role in society. In this regard, the division was not
between Christian and Muslim, but between the traditional society,
both Christian and Muslim, and a victorious army of freedom
ScH. L. REV. 669 (1997) (noting there were "two main blocs" involved in the South
African constitutional process).
92 See Calhoun & Delargy, supra note 80, at 131.
9 For more on the Islamic and Christian schism that marked much of the early
Eritrean resistance movement, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. Political
conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Eritrea date back to at least the 1940s,
when parties, such as the Moslem League (ML) and the Christian Unionist Party (UP),
independently sought to define Eritrean identity. See INDEPENDENCE, supra note 38, at
56-57. Later, the ELF emphasized Pan-Islamic unity to encourage aid from Arab states.
See id. The formation of the EPLF in 1972, with joint Muslim and Christian leadership,
marked a significant step toward nationalist, nonsectarian unity, but the societal
divisions remained. See ERLICH, supra note 39, at 31.
94 See John S. Pobee, Religious Human Rights in Africa, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
163, 164-65 (1996). Nigeria was divided between Christian and Islamic parts of the
country. See id. at 164. As in the Sudan and Nigeria, see id. at 164-65, the religious
differences in Eritrea also reflected, to an uncomfortable degree, ethnic differences, with
Coptic, Tigrigna-speaking highlanders related to their Ethiopian neighbors to the south,
and the Muslim, Tigre and Arabic-speaking lowlanders more connected to their Arab
Muslim brethren to the north. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text (addressing
religious and geographic divisions in Eritrea).
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fighters that had a long history of supporting equality for women
and, perhaps more than any other liberation movement in history,
had incorporated women in the larger struggle at all levels.95 The
status of women was an issue that loomed larger than all others.96
In some ways, it is symbolic of the overall difficulties inherent in
trying to draw up a modem, liberal, and democratic constitution
for a nation still steeped in its traditional ways. Inevitably, this
contradiction became for many the focus of the upcoming
constitutional dialogue.
A final difficulty facing the constitution-makers was the lack
of a significant constitutional tradition among the Eritrean
population. Eritrea had never before been an independent nation,97
nor had its constituent parts ever had any significant experience
with constitutionalism. Neither the Italians nor the British had
introduced a written constitution during their administration of the
colony. The U.N.-dictated 1952 Eritrean Constitution had no roots
in the populace and was largely ignored by Haile Selassie until he
finally abrogated it.98 After the federation dissolved, the Ethiopian
Constitution was theoretically applicable to Eritrea, but it was
based on the absolute sovereignty of the Emperor and never had
95 Estimates vary, but as many as 30% of EPLF fighters were women. See John
Balzar, Horror to Hope: Birth of a Nation, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1995 at A8; see also
UNITY IN DIVERSITY, supra note 16, at 19 (estimating women comprised 13% of front-
line fighters and 30% of EPLF membership). Women's rights were a significant part of
the EPLF's National Democratic Programme of 1977. See NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
PROGRAMME OF THE ERITREAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT 30 (1977) [hereinafter EPLF
PROGRAMME]. Also during the struggle, the EPLF's Central Committee mandated a
*comprehensive marriage law in 1977, applicable to Eritrean fighters, which gave
unprecedented rights to Eritrean women. See AGAINST ALL ODDS, supra note 34, at 132.
96 When the Constitutional Commission of Eritrea held the first meeting of its
Advisory Board on Customary laws, elders from various Eritrean ethnic groups
identified the issue of women's rights as the most controversial issue involved in
reconciling customary laws with internationally recognized human rights standards. See
Daniel Mebrahtu, Ripe Time, ERI. PROFILE, Aug. 26, 1995, at 3. This prediction proved
accurate, as is clear from accounts of the seminars and meetings held in the upcoming
years. From my days in Asmara, I have vivid images of khaki-clad freedom fighter
women walking down the streets side-by-side with fully cloaked women in traditional
garb. This was more than a visual contradiction; it accurately reflected the coexistence
of two societies on the streets of the country.
9' See YOHANNES, supra note 32, at 1.
98 See supra note 37 and accompanying text,
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any meaningful impact in Eritrea, especially after the ascension of
the Dergue in the mid-1970s. 9
So while the Eritreans may have had the constitutional
moment, they had no easy road to constitutional success.
B. Drafting an Eritrean Constitution
In April 1993, shortly after the results of the overwhelming
vote for independence from Ethiopia had been certified and
independence declared, the Provisional Government of Eritrea
issued a proclamation calling for the establishment of a
Constitutional Commission.'0 The Commission was charged with
drafting a democratic constitution and organizing public
participation in the constitutional process.)° In July 1993, Eritrean
President Isaias Afwerki asked noted Eritrean scholar Bereket
Habte Selassie to chair this commission.
2
99 During the first few years of the Dergue's rule, Eritreans and Ethiopians alike
endured torture and mass arrests. See AGAINST ALL ODDS, supra note 34, at 19. In
Ethiopia, a campaign of street executions in 1976, known as the "Red Terror," included
the slaughter of more than 10,000 people to destroy the Dergue's opposition. See id. In
one nine-month period during the same year in Eritrea, an estimated 450 civilians were
killed and 1,000 were arrested and sent to prisons in Asmara. See id.
100 See ERI. PROC. No. 37/1993 (1993).
10l See id.; see also CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF ERITREA, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPOSALS FOR PUBLIC DEBATE 3 (1995) [hereinafter CCE: PROPOSALS]; Mussa Hussein
Naib, The Eritrean Constitution-Making Process and Its Philosophy 3 (1998)
(unpublished Degree of Law thesis, University of Asmara) (on file with author). Mussa
Naib, now the Attorney General of Eritrea, served as a member of the Executive
Committee of the Constitutional Commission of Eritrea, and his academic thesis, on the
Eritrean constitutional process, is drawn largely from his own experiences. See id. at 1.
1"2 See Interview with Dr. Bereket Habte Selassie, William E. Leuchtenburg
Professor of African Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in
Chapel Hill, N.C., at 4 (July 9-10, 1997) [hereinafter Dr. Bereket Interview].
Dr. Bereket has a long and distinguished history. Holder of both a Ph.D. and an
L.L.B. from the University of London, he served as both the Attorney General and a
Supreme Court Justice in Haile Selassie's Imperial Ethiopia before fleeing Ethiopia in
the mid-1970s to join the EPLF. See Peggy Ann Hoyle, Eritrean National Identity: The
Role of Education and the Constitution 151 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)) (on file with author). After two years with
the fighters inside Eritrea, he went to the United States and, between 1985 and 1991,
served as the EPLF representative at the United Nations. See Dr. Bereket Interview,
supra, at 4. In 1993, he was on the faculty of Howard University's Department of
African Studies, see Hoyle, supra, at 151, and is currently on the faculty at the
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Following extensive preparatory work, including the drafting
of the enabling legislation and a budget,"3 the proclamation
actually creating the Constitutional Commission and the
parameters of the upcoming process was issued in March 1994.
' 04
The commission was to be composed of fifty members, and was to
be representative of the diverse Eritrean populace.105 The
Commission was charged not only with drafting a constitution for
the country, but also with the responsibility to "organize and
manage a wide-ranging and all embracing national debate and
education through public seminars and lecture series on
constitutional principles and practices."'0 6
One month later, the fifty members of the Commission were
appointed, as were those among the fifty who were to serve on the
ten-member Executive Committee.' °7 The members represented
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Dr. Bereket is also widely published. His books include CONFLICT AND
INTERVENTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 28, and ERITREA AND THE UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 35. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra, at 3.
103 Dr. Bereket prepared a budget estimate of $4.5 million in the fall of 1993 and
discussed possible Commission members with Eritean President Isaias Afwerki. See Dr.
Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 15. Dr. Bereket also drafted the basic legislation
establishing the Constitutional Commission, later enacted as Eritrean Proclamation No.
55/1994. See id. at 22.
104 ER. PROC. No. 55/1994 art. 4, § 1 (1994) reads:
The mission of the Commission shall be:
1) To draft a constitution on the basis of which a democratic order would be
established, and which, as the basic law, shall be the ultimate point of reference
of all the laws of the country, and the final arbiter of all basic issues in dispute.
The other listed missions of the Commission are to organize national debate and
education, see infra note 106 and accompanying text; to "seek and receive assistance in
funds, written materials in additional expert opinion on different constitutional
practices... and to learn from the experience of other countries"; and "to present to the
National Assembly a Draft Constitution... and to prepare a final draft... for eventual
submission to a democratically formed representative body," Id. art. 4, § 4. Article 5
empowers the Commission to carry out these missions via seminars, forums, issuing
directives, and drafting a constitution. See id. art. 5.
'05 Eritrean Proclamation No. 55/1994 art. 6, § 1 mandates a fifty-member Council
of the Commission, and art. 6, § 2 states that "[t]he members of the Council shall be
experts and other citizens with proven ability to make a contribution to the process of
constitution making representing a cross-section of Eritrean society."
106 Id. art. 4, § 2.
107 Eritrean Proclamation No. 55/1994 art. 6, § 1 states that "[t]he council of the
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Eritreans from many backgrounds. 0 8  All nine of the distinct
Eritrean ethnic groups were represented, as were Christians,
Muslims, and animists."° The ages of the members ranged from
thirty-four to eighty-two. ° Women were assigned twenty-one of
the fifty places on the Commission."'
The actual drafting process can best be characterized as one in
which broad constitutional principles were consistently refined,
narrowed, and given concrete substance. The Commission started
the process by creating four ad hoc committees to conduct
research into substantive areas, as well as a separate committee to
handle civic education and public debate."2 Two advisory boards
were created: a fifteen member Advisory Board of Foreign
Experts, which included lawyers and scholars from Africa, Europe
and the United States,"3 and an Advisory Board on Customary
Commission (hereinafter the Council) shall be composed of fifty (50) members elected
by the National Assembly." The Proclamation also creates an Executive Committee, see
id. art. 9, and the positions of Chairman of Council, see id. art. 12, Vice-Chairman of
Council, see id. art. 13, and Secretary of Council, see id. art. 14, but does not provide a
method of selecting members for these positions. In September 1993, Dr. Bereket
recommended, but did not appoint, several Eritreans, mostly lawyers, to Eritrean
President Isaias Afwerki as possible members of the Constitutional Commission's
Executive Committee. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 7. The Eritrean
government and ruling PFDJ chose other members. See id. at 8-9.
108 See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 9.
109 See id.
110 See Hoyle, supra note 102, at 150.
"' See id. The majority of the Commission members were veteran fighters from
the independence struggle. See Bereket Habte Selassie, Creating a Constitution for
Eritrea, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1998, at 164, 165 [hereinafter Constitution for Eritrea];
see also Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 9. The members represented both
rural and urban areas, professionals from groups such as the Eritrean Chamber of
Commerce, and Eritreans in the Diaspora. See Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-
Determination in Principle and Practice: The Ethiopian-Eritrean Experience, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 91, 129 (1997) [hereinafter Self-Determination]. Members
of the Executive Committee and the Council are listed in a CCE pamphlet. See
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF ERITREA, INFORMATION ON STRATEGY, PLANS, AND
ACTIVITIES 2 (1995) [hereinafter CCE: INFORMATION].
12 These bodies included the Committee on Governmental Institutions and Human
Rights, the Economic Committee, the Social and Cultural Committee, the Committee on
Governance and Related Issues, and the Civic Education and Public Debate Committee.
See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 4.
113 The head of this body was Professor Owen Fiss of Yale Law School. See id. at
5. Other members included Professor Martin Doornbos from the Institute of Social
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Laws, with forty-five members made up of representatives of the
community elders from each of Eritrea's ethnic- groups."'
The Commission planned a four-step constitutional process,
which it initially projected would last two years from start to
ratification, with a cost of approximately $4.3 million."5
According to the original plan, the first phase would be devoted to
organizing the Commission, raising funds, beginning the drafting,
and public education." 6 Phase two would be largely focused on
educating the public about the role of the Commission and about
basic constitutional ideas, and to developing some concrete
constitutional proposals for public debate."7 The third phase was
to be used for debate of these proposals both publicly and within
the Commission, leading to the writing of a draft constitution. The
fourth phase would be dedicated to a public debate on this draft
and, ultimately, the submission of the draft to the National
Assembly and to a separate elected body for ratification.18
During the first phase, which began in April 1994, the
Commission set up offices, assigned tasks, and organized
Studies, the Hague; Mr. Bona Malwal from St. Anthony's College, Oxford; Professor
Didier Maus from the University of Paris, Sorbonne; Dr. Zaki Mustapha from the Law
Office of A.Z. Yemani in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Professor Spiros Simitis from the
University of Frankfurt, Germany; Dr. Laszlo Solyom, the President of the
Constitutional Court in Budapest, Hungary; and Mr. Peter Weiss of the Center for
Constitutional Rights in New York, New York. See id. For a full list of members of the
Advisory Board of Foreign Experts, see id.
".. See id at 5. For a full list of the members on the Advisory Board on Customary
Laws, see id. Fifteen different sets of customary laws exist among Eritrea's nine ethnic
groups. See Mebrahtu, supra note 96, at 3. In one region, Hamassien, for example, six
different customary laws apply in different parts of the region. See id. The customary
laws include some ideas normally considered. "modem," such as control of executive
power and the importance of due process of law, but have a more traditional, restrictive
view on issues like the equality of men and women. See id.
115 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 11, at 7. The State of Eritrea provided
$384,000, or approximately 9% of the estimated budget. See id. Nations such as
Norway, Germany, Canada, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States
contributed to the CCE's budgetary needs. See id.
116 See id. at 7-8.
"l See id. at 11.
1's See id at 17. The Proclamation did not specify the exact nature of the body that
would have to give final approval to the constitution, but it did make it clear that it
should be a "democratically formed representative body" that would be separate from
the National Assembly. ERI. PROC. No. 55/1994 art. 4, § 4 (1994).
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preliminary public seminars.'19 Internally, substantive debates
began after Chairman Bereket submitted twenty-two questions
outlining issues he had drawn from other constitutions, 120 raising
basic constitutional questions like separation of powers, the role of
political parties, and the role of the military. At the request of
Commission members, the issue of women's rights was added to
the agenda as a separate item.'
In July 1994 the Commission held what was termed a "mini"
international conference in Asmara, which focused on key
119 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 7. The full Constitutional
Commission began inaugural meetings on April 17, 1994. See Dr. Bereket Interview,
supra note 102, at 14. Before these formal meetings, and before the Commission had an
office, some CCE members held logistical meetings at the Municipality of Asmara
building. See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 9; see also Dr. Bereket Interview,
supra note 102, at 15. During the constitutional process, the full, fifty-member
commission met approximately every three months. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra
note 102, at 23.
121 See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 14. The 22 questions dealt with:
(1) separation of powers; (2) presidential or parliamentary (or mixed) government; (3)
limiting government powers; (4) appointing government officials; (5) powers, terms,
and election of the executive branch; (6) foreign relations leadership; (7) the legislature
(unicameral or bicameral, election, role, etc.); (8) the judiciary; (9) emergency
suspension of the constitution; (10) decentralization; (11) the military's role; (12)
religion; (13) basic rights guarantees; (14) guarding minority rights; (15) political parties
and their roles; (16) control of the economy; (17) school curricula; (18) mass media;
(19) nationality; (20) the connection between international and national law; (21)
amending the constitution; and (22) ratification of the constitution. See Peggy Ann
Hoyle, supra note 102, at 166. Dr. Bereket later summarized these issues into seven
general questions:
1. What lessons, if any, do historical experiences offer?
2. Do such experiences yield helpful models or guidelines?
3. Is it desirable, or practical, to use models; are they transferable like some
technology?
4. What are the values and goals that a nation needs most emphatically to
promote and protect? Should these be incorporated into the constitution, and if
so, how?
5. What form of government would be best suited for Eritrea?
6. What degree of centralization should there be?
7. Should there be an official language, or languages? If so, which ones should
be chosen, and why?
Constitution for Eritrea, supra note 111, at 165.
21 See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 15.
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constitutional issues identified by the Commission.1 12  At this
meeting, papers were submitted by the four substantive
committees that had been formed, 123 and the Commission members
also heard and discussed presentations by the Namibian and Swiss
ambassadors to Ethiopia and by the Chairman of the
Constitutional Committee of Ethiopia.124
In the second phase of the process, the Commission
consolidated the twenty-two questions into four themes, focusing
on the constitution's relationship to government, human rights,
social and economic rights, and democracy.2 5  Commission
members were assigned to draft issue papers on these themes,
including analysis and recommendations for each topic. 2 6  The
issue papers were presented and debated at an International
Symposium held in Asmara in January 1995, at which two
hundred Eritreans and forty-two invited experts from around the
world participated in the discussions. 27 After the conference, the
122 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 9.
123 See id. Topics discussed at the meeting included: (1) governmental institutions;
(2) human rights and the rule of law; (3) social and cultural issues in the constitution; (4)
governance and the constitution; and (5) economic issues and the constitution. See id.
A number of Eritrean scholars and governmental officials also participated in the
conference. See id.
"2 See id. The ambassadors and chairman submitted papers about their respective
nations' constitutional experiences. See id. Because the constitutional process had just
begun, and because funding was not available at the time, the international guests were
limited to those from nations around Eritrea, including an Egyptian scholar from Cairo
University. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 16.
125 See Hoyle, supra note 102, at 167.
126 See id.
127 See id at 13; see also Naib, supra note 101, at 14-15. The Commission
members' papers fell under the following four themes:
(1) The Constitution and its Relation to Government-a paper was prepared on
the legislature by Kebreab Habtemichael, the judiciary by Yohannes Berhane,
the electoral system by Gebrehiwet Tesfagiorgis, and decentralization by
Commission Chair Bereket Habte Selassie;
(2) The Constitution and Human Rights-a paper on this theme was prepared
by Dr. Seyoum Haregot and Paulos Tesfagiorgis;
(3) The Constitution and Economic and Social Rights-a paper was prepared
on economic rights by Commissioners Fessahazione and Mesghenna and on
social and cultural rights by Mehret Iyob and Zabra Jaber;
(4) The Constitution and Democracy-a paper on this theme, entitled Equality
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Commission and its members transformed the issue papers into
position papers.1
28
Seven months later, in August 1995, the Commission approved
and published a number of "proposals" relating to the upcoming
constitution."' These proposals were divided into two parts. In
part one, the Commission outlined a number of broad principles
relating to the basic constitutional framework, stressing the
primacy of the constitution as the organic link between the people
and the government, the importance of democracy, diversity, and
national unity, and other hallmarks of a constitutional order.130 In
part two, the Commission for the first time established specifics of
what was envisaged for the forthcoming constitutional order."'
Guarantees Under the Constitution, was prepared by Dr. Gebrehiwet
Tesfagiorgis.
See Hoyle, supra note 102, at 167-73.
These issue papers were made available at CCE headquarters, and a summary report on
the conference was published in 1995 in Tigrigna, Arabic, and English. See
CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 13-14.
128 Eight papers were produced: (1) The Electoral System; (2) The Legislative
Branch; (3) Women and the Constitution; (4) Decentralization; (5) Chapter on
Fundamental Rights and Freedom in the Constitution; (6) The Executive Branch and the
Structure of Government-Which System is Appropriate for Eritrea?; (7) The Judiciary;
and (8) Defense and Security Institutions. See id. at 14.
129 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101. The Commission published the
proposals in Tigrigna, Arabic, and English, and also disseminated them via radio (the
key news medium in Eritrea) and television. See Hoyle, supra note 102, at 157.
130 The pamphlet defines a constitution as "a basic law which governs the workings
of government and society. It is the highest law of a country providing for the
establishment of government and the manner in which it administers its citizens and
defining the rights and responsibilities of citizens." CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101,
at 3. Part I suggests that Eritrea's political system should be based on nationalism,
secularism, and democracy, and adds that "[t]he experience of our revolution provides
incontrovertible evidence to prove that a diverse society can be a source of unity and
strength rather then one of division and weakness." Id. at 8. The pamphlet
acknowledges the need for political pluralism, respect for human rights, and institutions
to implement these goals in a constitutional system. See id. at 6-7. The pamphlet also
emphasizes that "[a] constitution without constitutionalism is a lifeless document." Id.
at 4.
131 In both the Proposals and the final drafts of the Constitution, the CCE
consciously omitted details and implementation strategies. This was based on a
philosophy that "[a] constitution contains, in generic terms of principle, provisions on
the powers and responsibilities of government and the rights and duties of citizens. Its
application is dealt with by laws and regulations." Id. at 3. For example, the CCE
decided that issues such as employment and economic development should be addressed
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These included a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly,
with members elected for five-year terms."' This Assembly would
choose the chief executive, the President, who would be
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and would be limited to
two five-year terms."' There would be an independent judiciary,
with a Supreme Court and lesser courts to be set up by law, and
the Supreme Court would have an express grant of authority to
determine the constitutionality of any law or governmental
action. 134 Federalism was rejected in favor of a unitary
governmental structure,'3 5 and the suggestion was made that there
only generally in the Constitution. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 35;
see, e.g., ERI. CONST. ch. III, art. 21(5) ("The National Assembly shall enact laws
guaranteeing and securing the social welfare of citizens, the rights and conditions of
labour and other rights and responsibilities .... ").
132 See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 22; ERI. CONST. ch. IV, art. 31.
The CCE decided to follow the example of the 1952 Eritrean Constitution's unicameral
legislature, as well as the extant Provisional Government's unicameral National
Assembly. See Kebreab Habte Michael, The Legislative Power, Presentation of Issue
Paper No. 1, Part 1 at the First International Symposium on the Making of the Eritrean
Constitution (Jan. 7-12, 1995) (transcript on file with author).
133 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101, at 23; ERI. CONST. ch. V, arts. 39, 41.
Though it acknowledged that "executive bodies have shown a persistent tendency to
accumulate power in their own hands," the CCE decided that "since a strong leadership
with clear vision is essential for development, the establishment of an appropriate
executive body is fundamental." CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101, at 20.
Nevertheless, the executive was one of the most frequently discussed topics during the
public debates. See Hoyle, supra note 102, at 160; see also supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text. The CCE proposed Parliamentary (indirect) election of the
President because its members felt that "electing the president through a direct popular
vote, may cause national election to assume some undesirable personal aspects and to
reflect regionalistic overtones." Amanuel Sahle, A Deeper Meaning of Democracy, ERI.
PROFILE, Apr. 6, 1996, at 2 (quoting Mussa Naib of the CCE's executive committee).
134 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101, at 23; ER. CONST. ch. VI, arts. 48, 49.
There was extensive debate about whether it would be better to have this power of
judicial review lodged in a separate Constitutional Court, but the Commission opted to
give this power to the Supreme Court. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 36.
135 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101, at 27 ("[I]t is essential that Eritrea should
have a unitary government. This is consistent with our goal of building a unified and
strong nation."); ERI. CONST. ch. I, art. 1(5). Unity is understandably essential in a
country containing nine ethnic groups and evenly divided between Muslims and
Christians. The Commission was building on a sense of unity and solidarity developed
during the thirty-year struggle against often oppressive Ethiopian governments. See
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 38, at 1.
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be no official language.'36 The proposals contained a guarantee of
democracy, but after extensive debate the Commissioners decided
not to mandate any specific electoral system.37 A number of
fundamental rights-life, privacy, freedom of belief, expression
and organization-were included,' along with a discussion of
concomitant duties. 39 Special emphasis was given to the equality
of women, with the statement "it should be clearly stated in the
constitution that all rights and duties apply to both men and
women without gender distinction.'
40
136 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101, at 29. The constitution mandates that
"[t]he equality of all Eritrean languages is guaranteed." ERI. CONST. ch. I, art. 4(3). The
issue is very important to Eritreans, in part, because Ethiopia imposed Amharic (the
official Ethiopian language at the time) on Eritreans in schools and in public businesses.
See Calhoun & DeLargy, supra note 80, at 129. The Ethiopian regime even burned
Arabic and Tigrigna texts. See Legacy, supra note 21, at 4. During the struggle for
independence, the EPLF began radio broadcasts in all national languages. See Calhoun
& DeLargy, supra note 80, at 131. After the EPLF's victory, the government began
trying to educate each student in his or her mother tongue. See id.
137 "[Wle think it is sufficient to describe in the constitution that the electoral
system should ensure fair representation and full participation of all eligible citizens."
CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101, at 28. The final constitution guarantees the right to
vote, see ERI. CONST. ch. III, art. 20, and requires the National Assembly to "enact an
electoral law, which shall ensure the representation and participation of the Eritrean
people," Id. ch. IV, art. 30(2).
138 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101, at 24; cf. ERI. CONST. ch. III, art. 15
(Right to Life and Liberty); art. 18 (Right to Privacy); art. 19 (Freedom of Conscience,
Religion, Expression of Opinion, Movement, Assembly, and Organisation). After
public debates, the Commission changed the related proposal advocating a secular
government to reflect that the Commission advocated a government that would not
interfere with religion, rather than an atheist government. See Hoyle, supra note 102, at
161.
"I See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101, at 25 ("To be faithful and obedient to
one's country and its constitution, to protect one's own country and do national service,
and to respect national laws are some of the main duties of citizens."); cf. ERI. CONST.,
ch. III, art. 25 (Duties of Citizens).
140 CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 101, at 25; cf. ERI. CONST., ch. I., art. 5 (Gender
Reference). Women's rights has long been a critical issue for the EPLF and now the
PFDJ. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Women's rights were a significant
part of the EPLF's National Democratic Programme of 1977. See EPLF PROGRAMME,
supra note 95, at 30. After liberation, the National Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW)
argued that women's rights should be explicitly written in the constitution, although
some Commission members felt mentioning gender equality in the preamble would be
sufficient. See UNITY IN DIVERSITY, supra note 16, at 20. The position of the Eritrean
Women's Union eventually prevailed. See id.; see also ERL CONST. ch. III, art. 41
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Following the release of the proposals and the ensuing debate,
the Commission drew up a draft Constitution, which the
Commission released for publication in July 1996.141 This draft
consisted of a preamble, seven chapters, and fifty-nine articles,
142
and substantively mirrored the Commission's earlier proposals.
The Commission met in February and March 1997 to finalize
the Constitution.1 43  The members approved the final draft for
submission to the National Assembly, the first step in the
ratification process, as required by the Commission's charter.' 44
The final step of the process involved submission of the
Constitution to a Constituent Assembly, which was composed of
seventy-five National Assembly members, three hundred ninety-
eight Eritreans who had been elected by the population to the
nation's six Regional Assemblies, and seventy-five representatives
elected by Eritreans residing abroad.' 45 The Constituent Assembly
discussed the final draft of the Constitution in the City Hall of
Asmara for three days in May 1997.146 On May 23, 1997, after
(Equality Under the Law); supra note 58 and accompanying text.
141 See Naib, supra note 101, at 24. Prior to publishing the draft, the CCE
submitted it to the National Assembly as required by Proclamation 55/1994. See ERL
PROC. NO. 55/1994 art. 5, § 4 (1994). The National Assembly decided to strengthen the
rights of women in the draft, which originally included a compromise article that
enabled the new National Assembly to pass laws dealing with inequality. See Dr.
Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 28; see also ERI. CONST. ch. III, art. 14.
(guaranteeing equality before the law and forbidding various forms of discrimination,
including gender discrimination).
142 See En. CONST. (revised Mar. 20, 1997).
143 See CCE Making Preparations for Final Draft, ERI. PROFILE, Feb. 22, 1997, at
1; CCE Council Finalizes Draft, ERI. PROFILE, Mar. 15, 1997, at 1. Before submitting
the revised draft to the National Assembly, the CCE added the position of Advocate
General to the chapter on the judiciary. See ER. CONST. ch. VI, art. 54; Dr. Bereket
Interview, supra note 102, at 29.
144 See ER. PROC. No. 55/1994 art. 4, § 1. The National Assembly did not make
any changes to the revised draft at this time. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102,
at 32.
15 See Naib, supra note 101, at 24. The National Assembly established these
criteria for the Constituent Assembly in Proclamation 92/96. See id. Due to
deteriorating relations with the Sudan, the 12 spaces allotted to Eritreans there were not
used. See id. Fourteen additional delegates were absent, so the total who participated in
the National Constituent Assembly was 522. See id.
146 See id.
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making several minor changes,17 the Assembly unanimously
ratified the Constitution, just in time for the next day's celebration
of four years of nationhood, 14 and the sixth anniversary of the
EPLF entry into Asmara to end the thirty-year war for the
independence of Eritrea. 14
9
C. Public Participation in the Eritrean Constitution-Making
Process
No description of the Eritrean constitution-making process is
complete without a discussion of the truly outstanding
characteristic of the Eritrean experience, the Commission's
extensive campaign, at every stage, to educate and involve the
public in the constitutional process. Using everything from comic
books to musical plays, 5° radio broadcasts to secondary school
essay contests, 5' the Commission introduced people who had
never even heard the word "constitution" to the notion of the
primacy of the Constitution, and to the need to respect the rights of
those protected by it.
More importantly, the Commission went beyond just educating
a passive public, and made every effort to actively engage the
population in the constitutional process. The records of the
literally thousands of meetings and seminars surrounding the
drafting of the Eritrean Constitution have yet to be compiled and
made public, but even the fragmentary accounts now available
"4 During discussions, the Constituent Assembly expanded parliamentary
immunity, which the revised draft permitted only during sessions of the National
Assembly, to the entire five-year parliamentary term. See ER!. CONST. ch. IV, art. 38(2);
Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 33; Naib, supra note 101, at 25 nn.l-2. The
Constituent Assembly also slightly altered the foreign policy article of the National
Objectives chapter: "The foreign policy of Eritrea is based on respect for state
sovereignty and independence and on promoting the interest of regional and
international peace, cooperation, stability and development." ER1. CONST. ch. II, art. 13
(emphasis added). The draft had read "cooperation, harmony and development." ER!.
CONST. ch. II, art. 13 (revised May 23, 1997) (emphasis added).
148 See Constitutional Assembly Ratifies Nation's Basic Law, ERI. PROFILE, May 24,
1997, at 1.
149 See Self-Determination, supra note 111, at 119.
150 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 16; Naib, supra note 101, at 13
(referring to a book in cartoon form entitled Elements of a Constitution).
151 See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
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reveal that the participants were actively engaged in the
constitutional discourse, questioning various proposals, voicing
their concerns about the impact of the Constitution on their
personal lives, and even, at times, questioning the legitimacy of
the Constitutional Commission itself.
52
The extensive campaign to involve the public in the
constitutional process commenced at the very beginning of phase
one, 153 when the Commission translated a number of international
compacts and legal documents, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, into Tigrigna and Arabic, and disseminated them for
public discussion.5 4  The Commission also held numerous public
seminars throughout Eritrea and among Eritreans in the Diaspora,
reaching more than ten thousand people.15  The participants were
informed and encouraged to participate in the upcoming process,
and were also educated about basic concepts such as democracy
and the rule of law. 1
56
Consistent with the original plan, the Constitutional
152 1 can personally attest to at least one challenge to the Commission's legitimacy.
I attended several sessions of the University of Asmara Law Program class on
Constitutional Law, taught by Kebreab Habte Michael, one of the key Commission
members. During a class, one of the students vigorously challenged him about the lack
of democracy in clhoosing the Commission membership. I then learned that this same
student issued the same challenge as the very first question in a highly publicized public
seminar sponsored by the Commission in a large hall in Asmara. Such challenges were
apparently not rare. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 9-12.
153 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
154 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 10-11. Other documents translated
included: (1) The Declaration of the Principles on International Cultural Cooperation;
(2) The Declaration on the Principles to Development; (3) The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; (4) The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; (5) The Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women; (6) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women; and (7) The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. See id.
"' See id. at 8. Seminars abroad were held in cities throughout Europe, Asia, the
United States, Africa (Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Kenya), and in the Middle East (Yemen
and Saudi Arabia). See id. Within Eritrea, seminars were held in larger cities and
towns, as well as at the sub-provincial level. See id. at 8-9. The sub-provincial seminars
included meetings for students, teachers, women's associations, lawyers, and members
of the Eritrean defense forces. See id.
156 See Naib, supra note 101, at 12.
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Commission's second phase was even more heavily oriented
towards public debate and education. 57 In December 1994, the
Commission held a four-day training session for four hundred
individuals enlisted to help in the public education and
involvement project.15 The sessions introduced the attendees to
the constitutional process and taught them how to educate others
and facilitate public debates. 5 9 The Commission also established
seven provincial offices and- seventy-three locally based
committees to assist in public education.'6
Printed materials were made available in as many local
languages as possible, but, because of Eritrea's low literacy rate,
the Commission had to come up with innovative means of
communicating with the populace. 6' Television and radio were
used whenever possible, 162 and the Commission also made use of
traditional oral means of communication, including mobile theater
groups and concerts dealing with constitutional themes. 16' A
cartoon comic book entitled Elements of a Constitution was
published.' 64 Special efforts were made to involve students in the
process. The Commission sponsored contests and debates, some
broadcast on radio and television, in schools and in the country's
sole university, and students were encouraged to raise
constitutional issues via poetry and the arts. 65  All told, the
157 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
158 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 11.
'I See Self-Determination, supra note 111, at 133-34. The trainees received eight
booklets on constitutional, social, and political issues, including a thirty-page handbook
and translations of various international legal documents.
160 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 12.
161 See Center Stage, supra note 8, at 229. Eritrea's literacy rate at this time was
estimated at 20%. See id.
162 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 17; Dr. Bereket Interview, supra
note 102, at 3.
163 See Naib, supra note 101, at 15; CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 15-16.
'64 See Naib, supra note 101, at 12.
165 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 16-17. The Commission sponsored
art, poetry, and essay contests centered on constitution-related themes for students, and
questions about constitutional issues were incorporated in the secondary school
curriculum. See id. at 16. Some of the secondary school student contests were
broadcast on radio, and university students participated in televised contests and a panel
discussion on five different constitutional issues. See id. at 17. Much of this activity
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Commission estimated that more than 500,000 Eritreans were
actively involved in this phase of the educational programs.' 66
Before beginning the debates in phase three, the Commission
held a series of seminars previewing this phase in Eritrea and
abroad.'67 Phase three itself commenced with public debates on
the constitutional proposals in October 1995.168 According to
Commission estimates, during this part of the public discourse,
147,000 Eritreans debated the constitutional proposals in 157
locales in Eritrea, while 11,000 other Eritreans participated in 16
locations abroad.
169
These debates, which on the average lasted about three hours,
generally began with a summary by a civic educator, followed by
questions and a discussion with the audience."7 o Extensive efforts
were made to record the debates, using note-takers and, whenever
possible, tape recorders. 7' The Commission proposed a number of
broad topics for debate,7 7 and those who attended responded on
issues of interest to them. Of particular concern was the explicit
gender-equality mandate in the proposals, since many of the more
was done in collaboration with other groups, such as the National Youth and Students
Association of Eritrea, the Ministry of Education, the Artists' Association, and foreign
airlines, including Egypt Air and Yemen Airlines (who provided prizes and tickets to
contest winners). See id.
166 See id. at 12. More than 40% of the participants in the public programs were
women. See id.
167 See Constitutional Seminars at Home and Abroad, ERI.' PROFILE, Oct. 21, 1995,
at 1. Seminar locations included Massawa, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Saudi Arabia, and
several European countries (Britain, Italy,' France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland). See id.
168 See Self-Determination, supra note 111, at 134. By this time, the Commission
had shifted its focus from research (by consolidating the four research committees into
one) to the Civic Education Committee and new Media Committee. See id.
169 See Naib, supra note 101, at 16.
170 See Hoyle, supra note 102, at 158.
171 See id at 159. Although the tapes have yet to be transcribed, in 1996 the
Commission heard a summary of public opinion from these debates. See Self-
Determination, supra note 111, at 134.
172 In August 1995, the CCE proposed six main topics for the debates: type of
government, basic human rights, system of government, electoral system, desirability of
national language(s), and role of the armed forces in the constitutional government. See
CCE Identifies Major Constitutional Issues, ERI. PROFILE, Aug. 26, 1995, at 1.
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tradition-minded Eritreans apparently feared, with good reason,'7 3
that a future government could use this provision to intrude into
family relationships and customary practices in areas like divorce,
land tenure, and marriage.' 74  Others who joined the debates
commented on the powers and limitations of the executive branch
and the role of the judiciary.' 75  There was widespread concern
among both Christian highlanders and Muslim lowlanders about
the specific proposal for a "secular state."'7 6  Many saw this as
requiring atheism, and as a result this terminology never made it to
the draft constitution. 7   In addition to the debates, the
Commission's media committee conducted other mass
informational campaigns. 78 They sponsored a radio program twice
a week in all Eritrean languages, broadcast a panel discussion on
television, and ran a series of newspaper articles on the
constitution. 179
Once the draft constitution was published, it served as the basis
of the final round of public activities. The Commission circulated
the draft in the local vernaculars, and another round of seminars
and meetings were held in villages, towns, and the Diaspora.8 0 In
all, more than 400,000 Eritreans participated in this part of the
173 I say "with good reason" because the EPLF/PFDJ position on women's rights
clearly contemplated changes in these areas. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying
text; see also Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 28-29.
174 See generally Hoyle, supra note 102, at 158 (detailing a five-hour meeting with
5,000 Eritreans that centered around family issues.)
171 See id at 160-61. For example, one participant at an October debate in Asmara
contended that allowing the National Assembly to elect the chief executive gave the
President too much power, while another suggested "that the constitution should include
a provision that allows [efficient] presidents to stay in power for life." Daniel Mebrahtu,
Constitution-Making: A People's Project, ER. PROFILE, Nov. 11, 1995, at 34.
176 See Hoyle, supra note 102, at 161.
117 See id.
171 See Naib, supra note 101, at 16.
'19 See id.
80 See id at 17. Ultimately, 68 locations hosted general public meetings, while 40
more meetings reached organized groups of women, students, workers, and
professionals. See id. Groups participating included the National Union of Eritrean
Women, the Eritrean Youth and Students' Association, and the National Confederation
of Eritrean Workers (NCEW). See id. at 18-21.
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public process. 8 ' Radio programs broadcast the constitution in
seven languages, while a documentary video, The Journey to the
Constitution Making Process, was shown in cities, villages, and
towns across Eritrea.
8 2
The final stages of the constitution-making process-
publication of the final draft, submission, to the National
Assembly, and ratification by the Constituent Assembly-were the
subject of massive publicity in the media."3 The decision to have
final ratification just in time for the May 24" independence
celebration was no happenstance. It allowed the final stage of the
constitutional process to occur: in full public light, as the
centerpiece of the biggest celebration of the year.184
V. Evaluating the Eritrean Process
A. Public Participation and Education
In light of the immense problems of poverty and nation-
building the Eritreans faced, it is hard to imagine that more could
have been done to educate and involve the public in the
constitution-making process. It is also clear that the Eritreans
gained much from this aspect of the process.
The public involvement certainly contributed to building
national solidarity and helping construct or solidify a national
identity, themselves worthy goals.' More importantly, if the
prevailing theory is accurate that public involvement increases the
development of constitutionalism, and public acceptance and
respect for the constitution is engendered by a process that is
transparent and as public as possible, 6 then the Eritrean
experience will stand out in the history of meaningful constitution-
"81 See id. at 17.
182 See id.
183 See, e.g., CCE Council Finalizes Draft, supra note 143; Constitutional Assembly
Ratifies Nation's Basic Law, supra note 148.
184 See Formulation of the Constitution Gives New Dimension to 6 h Liberation Day
Anniversary Celebrations, ERI. PROFILE, May 31, 1997, at 1.
"85 See generally Hoyle, supra note 102, at 191-204 (discussing the role of the
constitution-making process in constructing Eritrea's national identity).
16 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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making. Further, to the extent that it was imperative that the
Eritrean constitution-drafters educate the public about the rule of
law, democracy, and the meaning and principles of
constitutionalism,'8 7 then the Eritreans surely achieved this end.
In addition, the potential impact of the immense popularization
and education effort on those who now hold the reigns of power in
Eritrea, and are likely to do so for the foreseeable future, should
not be ignored. Although the EPLF had succeeded in gaining
overwhelming popular support by the time Eritrea gained its
independence, it had gained this summit by dint of its efforts as a
highly disciplined military and political force, which had used
popular support, sacrifice, and military prowess to seize power
from a brutal and ruthless colonial occupier - not the most fertile
grounds for developing a deep culture of constitutionalism."'
So it is especially important that the Eritrean leadership not
only acceded to the popular constitution-making process, but also
supported it, in public and private."9 The high public visibility of
the constitutional process, together with the present leadership's
very public commitment to that process, will make it much more
difficult for future Eritrean governments to ignore or discard the
187 "Ultimately, no objective is more important than civic education-the inculcation
of civic virtues." Howard, supra note 71, at 15; see also Golove, supra note 75
(suggesting that compromise be added to the constitution-making process in order to
"broaden[] the base of support and giv[e] different constituencies a self-interested reason
for insisting upon strict observance of the constitution").
188 See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text. The EPLF had proclaimed a
democratic program in the late 1970s, as it moved to shed its Marxist roots in the light
of Soviet and Cuban support for the Dergue. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
But even as it acquired state power, changed into the PFDJ, and set up the new Eritrean
state, there were certainly aspects of EPLF/PFDJ practice that could be described as
authoritarian, rather than democratic. See generally Eritrean Experiment, supra note 15
(detailing the steady but sometimes heavy-handed approach the EPLF used to install
democracy in Eritrea). For example, Iyob notes that, partly because of the revolution's
emphasis on secrecy, "the discourse about parties is subject to self-censorship and
ambiguity." Id at 663. See Calhoun & DeLargy, supra note 80, at 129 (applauding the
Eritrean government's constitutional efforts but concluding that additional efforts are
needed to bolster political rights, such as freedom of the press).
89 Dr. Bereket and his committee were given virtually complete autonomy by the
government. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 7, 32-33. The Eritrean
government (and hence the PFDJ) provided funding, $384,000 as of fall 1995, for the
Constitutional Commission. See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 7.
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Constitution.19 ° The preamble of the new Constitution describes
the Constitution as the product of the blood of the Eritrean martyrs
who died fighting for independence.' This is, in the context of
present-day Eritrea, an immensely important statement. It is all
the more significant because it is made in relation to a document
that had become the centerpiece of a very public discourse. No
flowery phrases and no amount of public involvement can
guarantee that a constitution will not be discarded at some future
date, but what happened between 1993 and 1997 will certainly
make it far more difficult for this to happen to the Eritrean
Constitution.
B. Self-Reliance and Self-Consciousness in the Eritrean
Constitution-Making Process
Two additional characteristics of the Eritrean constitution-
making process are worth brief commentary. The first is the
extreme self-consciousness with which the Eritreans carried out
their constitutional task. Perhaps more than any constitution-
makers since 1787,192 those involved in creating the Eritrean
Constitution believed and acted on the premises that they were
playing a meaningful historical role, and that how they carried out
that role was as significant as the end product of their activity.
This is especially true with regard to the extensive public
education and involvement in the Eritrean process. The first
Proclamation calling for the creation of a constitution gave those
charged with producing the constitution the added responsibility of
190 See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 7 ("people will feel that in the
future, if anybody tampers with this thing that they own, then they will take up arms if
necessary").
19' See ERI. CONST. pmbl.
192 The self-consciousness with which the American drafters acted has been
described as one of the unique aspects of American constitutionalism. See Christian G.
Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations On
State Constitution-Making In The Nineteenth-Century West, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 945, 950
(1994) [hereinafter American Constitutional Tradition]. This self-consciousness was
based on the recognition of the distinctions between ordinary statutory law and
constitutional law. See Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American
Constituionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 324 (1997).
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organizing public participation in the process. 93 The Proclamation
that established the Commission detailed the necessity for
organizing popular participation.'94  Official Commission
publications and statements proclaimed the essential nature of this
involvement,'95 and the importance of public participation was also
constantly reflected in the pronouncements of the Chairman and
other members of the Commission who spoke or wrote about the
196process.
Why the Eritreans felt and acted this way is an interesting
question. Certainly the role of the Chairman of the Commission
cannot be ignored. Dr. Bereket Habte Selassie is a senior African
statesman, one who witnessed decades of African experiments and
failures in constitutional politics. Both as an academic and as a
political actor, he observed the rise and fall of the first wave of
independent African constitutionalism, and his writings, since
undertaking the chairmanship, reflect the conclusion that a lack of
popular involvement and understanding led to many of those
constitutional failures. 9 7 It would, however, be an
oversimplification to attribute the Eritrean process to the influence
of one person, for the mobilization of the public as part of the
constitution-making process is also consistent with the long-
standing practices of the EPLF/PFDJ, which has always
emphasized popular involvement as the key factor in the struggle
for independence and national development.9 ' To a large degree,
193 See ERI. PROC. No. 37/1993 (1993), quoted in ERI. PROC. No. 55/1994 (1994).
194 See ER. PROC. No. 55/1994 arts. 4, 5, 7.
195 See CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 19; CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note
101, at 1.
196 See, e.g., Amanuel Sale, A Constitution from the People, to the People, ER.
PROFILE, Oct. 26, 1996, at 2 (quoting Commission Secretary Zemehret Yohannes: "Our
constitution is going to be incorporated into educational programs and curricula with a
view to acquainting the public with its provisions. It is only when the people know their
constitution in depth that defending it becomes a matter of course."); Sahle, supra note
133 (quoting Constitutional Commission Executive Committee member Mussa Naib:
"Constitution making is a political process in which the public participates and develops
its political awareness.").
'9 See Self-Determination, supra note 111; Constitution for Eritrea, supra note
I11.
198 See AGAINST ALL ODDS, supra note 34, at 64. See Hoyle, supra note 102, at 47-
57, for a detailed discussion of how public involvement has shaped Eritrean national
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the constitutional process can thus be seen as simply an extension
to another arena of the principles which carried the EPLF to
ultimate victory and the nation to independence.
Also consistent with the Eritrean liberation struggle, and with
the practices of the state that has emerged from it, is the self-
reliance and freedom from foreign control that characterized the
Eritrean constitution-making process and the document it
produced. This is not to say that the Eritrean Constitution had no
foreign antecedents or was a purely autarkic document. To the
contrary, the Eritreans freely looked for ideaslat other constitutions
and constitution-making processes. 99 Unlike -many other recent
examples, however, the Eritreans can claim their final document as
their own, the product of choices made by Eritreans, taking into
consideration the realities of Eritrean life.
200
A constitution is, in the last analysis, a political document: to
survive, it must reflect the present and future realities of its native
soil. From the beginning, the Eritreans resisted the "Lancaster
House" method of constitution-making, which involves foreign
drafting and imposition of a constitution.'O° All of the drafting was
done by Eritreans, and what foreign influence there was tended to
be early in the process, and was primarily devoted to helping the
Eritrean drafters prepare for the tasks ahead. Both the initial
"mini-international conference"2 2 . and the larger January 1995
203international gathering came before any significant drafting was
204done. In contrast to the recent Eastern European experience,
drafts were not circulated to Western "experts" for formal
commentary and suggested revisions.05 While there may have
identity.
199 See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 11-12, 14-15.
20 For a description of the extensive Western, and especially American, influence
on recent Eastern European constitution-making ventures, see generally Defeis, supra
note 91; Elster, supra note 1; Ludwikowski, supra note 1. See also MOTALA, supra
note 65 (discussing harm caused by Western influence on earlier African post-
independence constitutions).
201 See Self-Determination, supra note 111, at 131.
202 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 1.
205 See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
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been some informal contacts between the Eritrean drafters and
their friends and counterparts elsewhere, the final constitution was
clearly the product of the Eritreans, and not of foreign "experts."
The constitution that emerged belonged to them.'°6
C. Critique of the Eritrean Constitution-Making Process:
Participation Versus Democracy
In constitution-making, as in life, no venture of any
significance can proceed without criticism. In the case of the
Eritrean constitutional process, the criticisms have basically been
that, despite the widespread public involvement, the overall
process, or at least certain aspects of it, were insufficiently
democratic. °7  One claim was that the members of the
Commission should have been democratically elected rather than
government appointed.0 8
On a theoretical level, the notion of elections to a
Constitutional Commission has appeal; if democracy is the
ultimate goal, then it would make sense for the process itself to be
as purely democratic as possible. There is, however, a degree of
circularity in requiring democracy in the process that is supposed
to create democracy. In a society that already operates as a
democracy, it might be possible to write a new constitution
206 The Eritrean attitude toward foreign advice is aptly captured by Mussa Naib, an
Executive Committee member of the Constitutional Commission of Eritrea: "For our
constitution not to be a carbon copy of other countries' constitutions, we should be
critical in looking at advice given by non-citizens. Here, we should exercise free
political thinking." Viable, Long-Lasting Document, ERI. PROFILE, Aug. 12, 1995, at 3.
207 Some of these criticisms have focused on parts of the process without attacking
the overall legitimacy of the effort. A more extreme view has been offered primarily by
those affiliated with the remnants of the ELF, in which the constitution-makers are hand-
picked puppets, unrepresentative of the Eritrean people. In this version, the public
involvement is seen as a charade to build up popular support for the regime with no real
impact on the Constitution, which was itself dictated by the EPLF/PFDJ government,
and with both the choice of Commission members and the ratification process likewise
tainted by government control. See TESFATSION MEDHANIE, ERITREA AND NEIGHBORS IN
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 65-68 (1994); Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 53-54.
As discussed above, throughout the extended process there were also many criticisms
directed towards the substantive proposals and drafts of the Commission. See supra
notes 120-142, 168-177 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 107 (noting the selection process of the Constitutional
Commission of Eritrea); see also Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 10.
[Vol. 24
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
without violating any democratic norms. However, a society in
which democracy is the unrealized goal of the constitution
drafters, at some point in the process an element of non-
democracy, or "pre-democracy," is inevitable. 09 Important factors
in the constitutional process are transparency and publicity, rather
than democratic purity."21o
Moreover, regardless of theory, holding elections for
membership in a constitutional commission, given the situation in
Eritrea in 1993, would have been impractical. The referendum on
national independence had just been completed, and national
rebuilding had only just begun. At that stage, before the
Commission's extensive publicity campaign, most of the
population had little or no idea what a constitution was, and what
role a creature like a "Constitutional Commission" would play.
There were no political parties, no rules of the game, no way of
ensuring that any election would not degenerate into religious or
ethnic rivalry. And to the extent that the elections inevitably
would have been organized and supervised by the EPLF, which
held exclusive power in Asmara, they would have been subject to
the criticism of EPLF control.2"
209 Arato, supra note 69, at 191 (noting that "we cannot logically eliminate an
element of non-democracy prior to the democratic procedures that produce a democratic
constitution."); Elster, supra note 1, at 472 (noting the failure to have an elected
constituent assembly did not mar Hungarian constitution-making process). Indeed, the
failure of the French 18" century constitutional experiment has been blamed on a
process that was too democratic and, therefore, too subject to majoritarian whims. See
Arato, supra note 69, at 207 (discussing Hannah Arendt's view on problems with the
French experience).
210 See, e.g., Arato, supra note 69, at 205, 225; American Constitutional Tradition,
supra note 192, at 987; Richards, supra note 70, at 15. Along with the publicity and
transparency, however, it is also often necessary for the drafting and deliberative process
to take place with some degree of secrecy. See Forces and Mechanisms, supra note 72,
at 395 (discussing the need for elements of secrecy and private deliberation to go along
with the public participation in a constitution-making process); Arato, supra note 69, at
225. In addition to drafting in secret during the Philadelphia convention, the American
drafters were hardly the product of a highly democratic process. The drafters of our
constitution were chosen by and represented only a small minority of the
population: property owning white males. See Catherine MacKinnon, Freedom From
Unreal Loyalties: On Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation," 65 FORD. L. REV.
1773, 1774 (1997).
211 For instance, one writer criticized the referendum noting that while it may have
been supervised by the U.N., it was conducted by the EPLF. See MEDHANIE, supra note
1999]
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There is, however, another, related criticism that is not so
easily met. This is that, regardless of the desirability of holding
elections to the Constitutional Commission, the government
should have included representatives of other political groupings
among the Commission members."' There was no practical
obstacle to doing this, and requests for this to happen were in fact
211made, especially by members of the ELF in the Diaspora, some
of whom claimed to have a significant following inside Eritrea.24
The Commission Chairman welcomed their participation in the
public seminars and meetings and invited them to make
substantive suggestions about the shape of the coming
constitution,"' but neither he nor anybody else offered the
opposition a formal place at the constitution-drafting table.2 6
Thus, while the government had included in the Commission, and
even on the Executive Committee, a number of former ELF
leaders who had previously returned and had agreed to work with
the EPLF, there were no independent political forces represented
on the Commission."'
In the end, how one evaluates this omission depends largely on
one's view of the political situation in Eritrea following
independence. One might believe that there was a significant,
207, at 57-60. Unless the victorious EPLF was willing to cede authority to its long-time
rivals, vanquished in the field, anything that they did in Eritrea was subject to this
criticism. See id.
212 See Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 54; MEDHANIE, supra note 207, at 65-
67.
213 See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 10, 54.
214 See MEDHANIE, supra note 207, at 131.
215 Despite Chairman Bereket's express invitation, the ELF forces never articulated
any alternative version of Eritrean society that can stand in opposition to the
Constitution that was ultimately enacted. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at
53. Consequently, the Commission "concluded from that, early on, that there was a
national consensus based on the Front's charter, which everybody, even the so-called
opposition, accepted." Id.
216 See id.
217 The Constitutional Commission's Vice Chairman Azien Yasin, and the
Commission's Secretary Zemhret Yohannes, were both former ELF leaders, as were
Executive Committee members Zahara Jaber (one-time head of the ELF's women's
organization) and Idris Gelawdious. See Menghis Samuel's Interview of Dr. Bereket,
supra note 83, at 6. See also CCE: INFORMATION, supra note 111, at 2, for a full listing
of Constitutional Commission Members.
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legitimate political opposition with roots in the Eritrean
population, at home and abroad-an opposition that accepted
nationhood and represented a meaningful portion of the
population. If that were the case, then the exclusion of this
segment of society from the constitution-drafting process could be
considered a noteworthy, although not necessarily fatal, flaw
undermining the legitimacy of the constitutional process.
There are some questions, however, whether such forces really
existed, at least in a form that would have necessitated their
inclusion in the process. The Eritrean government, and the
Commission leadership, certainly did not believe that they did . 8
In the long run, given the democratic nature of the final document,
this deficiency in democracy of the process, if indeed it existed,
will most likely be less important than whether or not the
Constitution itself delivers on its promises of a pluralistic society
,-• 211
firmly committed to the rule of law.
Another challenge to the constitutional process - one that I
heard made by a number of westerners when I was in Asmara -
218 See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 52-54. Little needs to be said
about those in Eritrean society who supported the Ethiopians and opposed
independence-they had been defeated on the battlefield, and their political position had
been resoundingly rejected in the referendum. There was no more reason to include
them in the constitutional process than there was to reserve a place for the defeated
Tories in 1787. See id. at 10-11.
219 A similar criticism could be made to the final step in the process-the
ratification process. In Eritrea, ratification was not by referendum, but by a body that
was only partly popularly elected. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 46-47;
Naib, supra note 101, at 24-25. Some of the delegates to the final "Constituent
Assembly," which approved the constitution, were chosen by the National Assembly,
which itself had not been popularly elected. See Naib, supra note 101, at 24. Others
were chosen by more democratic means. They were selected by the popularly elected
Regional Assemblies and by Eritreans in the Diaspora. See id. Again, the process was
subject to being criticized as being controlled by the EPLF, and it certainly lacked the
democratic purity of ratification by referendum. Yei ratification by referendum is only
one means of ratification, and what is most important is that whatever ratification
process used must reflect and must be perceived to reflect an acceptance of popular
sovereignty. Ratification of the U.S. Constitution was not by referendum, but by bodies
of only limited democratic credentials, yet it has ,generally been considered sufficient to
satisfy the notion of popular acceptance and legitimacy. See American Constitutional
Tradition, supra note 192, at 986-87 (noting that popular ratification was not commonly
used in 18 " century America, and focus should be on recognition of popular sovereignty
rather than form of ratification).
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was that the public involvement was all window-dressing.
According to this account, the process was deficient because the
constitution-drafters were not really listening to the population but
were just following their own agenda or the agenda of the
government.120 If what is being said by this charge is that the
Commission members did not see their job as translating the
majority political tendencies of the day into constitutional
strictures, then it contains an element of truth, but this both
overstates the facts and misses the point.
The Commission did work under guidelines established by the
government-government Proclamations created the Commission,
defined its goals, and directed its activities. 22' This, however, is
more the norm than the exception in constitution-making projects.
Unless the existing government lacks sufficient support in the
population, it creates and directs the constitution-making process.
Nor is it really problematic that the Commission used as its
starting points the principles enunciated in the PFDJ Charter,222
given the unobjectionable nature of these principles-stability,
national unity, economic development, democracy, social justice,
and human rights.223
It is also inaccurate to say that the drafters ignored popular
input. The substantive Eritean constitution-drafting in large part
involved narrowing general principles down to specifics; issue
papers were transformed into broad proposals, and the proposals
were subsequently refined into particular Articles.2 The final
content was the result of a complex interaction between the
drafters, the contemporary ruling elite (the government and the
PFDJ), and the participants in the public debate. On some issues,
it is clear that public response did play a role, such as with the
removal of the description of the coming nation as a secular
220 See, e.g., Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 30-31.
221 The Commission's Chairman, Dr. Bereket, drafted some of these proposals. See
id. at 8.
222 See Bereket Habte Selassie, Constitution Making as a Historic Moment, Keynote
Speech at the First International Symposium on the Making of the Eritrean Constitution,
supra note 132.
223 See id.
224 See supra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
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225
state. In other areas, the role of various inputs is less clear.
Questions like whether to have a national language and whether to
have a separate constitutional court were not decided until late in
the process, after extensive public debate, and it is simply
impossible to gauge the impact on these issues of any one player
in the national dialogue.226
More to the point, the purpose of a constitution-drafting
process is not to memorialize the prevailing majority views of the
day but to craft a document and to help create a constitutional
order that will govern the citizens and the governors for the
centuries ahead. Drafters certainly have an obligation to listen to
their society, but ultimately the drafters themselves, subject to the
requirements of ratification and acceptance by the people, must
make the particular choices embodied in the final constitution.
What is most important is that the process itself be perceived as
legitimate by the population, and this can occur even if not one
word of the constitution is changed after consultations with the
public.
225 Many Eritreans strongly objected to the possibility of a secular government after
the idea was published with other constitutional proposals in 1995. See Hoyle, supra
note 102, at 200. Citizens thought a secular government would be an atheistic one, and
the government had to clarify that the proposals only meant that the government would
not interfere with religion in order to satisfy public opinion. See id. More opposition
arose when the first constitutional draft provided that public officials would take an oath
by swearing "in the name of the Eritrean martyrs" of the independence struggle. Id.
Many Eritreans, including a number of university students, felt the oath should be sworn
only to God; the final draft allows officials to swear to the martyrs or to God as they
choose. See id. Many religious leaders, however, including representatives of the
Eritrean Orthodox Church, Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants, supported the
Constitution's separation of religion from politics. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra
note 102 at 55-56. Early in the process, the country's religious leaders were invited to
the office of the Commission. See id. At this meeting, Dr. Bereket discussed with them
the Commission's intent to guarantee both freedom of religion and the separation of
church/mosque and the state, in the coming Constitution. See id.
226 Initially, some Commission members wanted to adopt Arabic and Tigrigna as
national languages in the constitution. See Dr. Bereket Interview, supra note 102, at 33.
However, members of the PFDJ and the general public (which were divided on the
issue) convinced the Commission that guaranteeing the equality of languages, yet
labeling two as "official," were mutually exclusive undertakings. See id. at 34. In
Eritrea in particular, language is a key component of ethnicity and culture. See id. at 33.
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VI. Conclusion
It would be rash to predict success for any particular act of
constitution-making, especially soon after it has been completed
and before it has been formally implemented."' Only the passage
of years reveals whether a constitution will be honored and
respected by both the governors and the governed, whether it will
bend men and women to its dictates or be overshadowed by the
necessities of the moment.
With his characteristic reticence, the current Eritrean President
has described his country's constitution-making experience as
"not perfect., 228  The tentative conclusion on the Eritrean's
constitution-making process, however, has to be a positive one.
The Eritreans created their own constitution. They did this in a
manner calculated to invest the public, as well as present and
future governments, in the survival and prosperity of the
Constitution and in making constitutionalism the basis of the
nation. They did this under conditions hardly conducive to a
grand constitutional experiment but with full knowledge of the
227 Having debated, drafted, and ratified the Constitution in a burst of energy, the
Eritreans are now taking their time in getting it off the ground. They describe this as
using their usual "pace of the tortoise." Eritrean Experiment, supra note 15, at 650. An
Electoral Commission was appointed to prepare the elections for the National Assembly,
the first step in implementing the process. According to discussions I had with a
member of this Commission when I was recently in Asmara, this Commission was
proceeding with its work when the fighting with Ethiopia erupted in May 1998, and this
has delayed further activity. While this delay might be of concern in some locales, it is
worth remembering that this is a country that was willing to wait two years to declare
formal independence after throwing out their occupiers and achieving de facto
independence. Akay'da gobi'ye, or "pace of the tortoise," is a consistent and long-
standing EPLF strategy, nurtured during thirty long years of revolutionary warfare, and
it is no surprise to see it operating here. See id.
228 President Isaias Replies to Questions on National, Regional and International
Issues, ER. PROFILE, May 24, 1997, at 3. In an interview with the Eritrean national
newspaper published on Liberation Day, May 24, 1997, the first anniversary of the
ratification of the Constitution, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki stated, "If the question
is whether we have realized all what [sic] we aspired for, the answer is definitely no. Of
course this does not mean underestimating the rich experience and practice that
contributed undoubtedly in raising the consciousness of citizens. This notwithstanding,
the experience acquired was not perfect. It had some shortcomings." Id. Afwerki cited
the brevity of the constitutional process, problems with the media, and a remaining "low
standard of general awareness of citizens who had long been deprived of educational
opportunities." Id.
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gravity of their undertaking. History can ask no more.

